Comparison Overview
Cisco Data Center and Cloud

Cisco Data Center and Cloud
170 W. Tasman Drive, San Jose, 95134, US
Last Update: 24/01/2026
The data center is no longer defined by where the hardware sits but by where your data goes. Find out how our switches, servers, and software can help you build a better, faster, automated, intent-based data center. Anywhere.

LTIMindtree
L&T Infotech, Technology Tower. Gate No. 5, Saki Vihar Road, Powai, Mumbai, Maharashtra 400072, IN, Mumbai, MH, IN, 400072
Last Update: 05/04/2026
LTIMindtree is a global technology consulting and digital solutions company that partners with enterprises across industries to reimagine business models, accelerate innovation, and drive AI-centric growth. Trusted by more than 700 clients worldwide, we use advanced tec...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Cisco Data Center and Cloud







LTIMindtree






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Cisco Data Center and Cloud in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for LTIMindtree in 2026.
Incident History - Cisco Data Center and Cloud (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Cisco Data Center and Cloud cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - LTIMindtree (X = Date, Y = Severity)
LTIMindtree cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Cisco Data Center and Cloud

LTIMindtree
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.