CISA
Company Details
Linkedin ID:
cisagov
Website:
Employees number:
1,741
Number of followers:
586,152
NAICS:
92
Industry Type:
Homepage:
http://www.cisa.gov
IP Addresses:
0
Company ID:
CYB_6312945
Scan Status:
In-progress
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Company CyberSecurity Posture
http://www.cisa.gov
NOTICE: This social media account will not be actively managed during the lapse in federal funding. We will not be able to respond or update until after funding is enacted. go.dhs.gov/lapse-2025 We lead the National effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to our cyber and physical infrastructure. Our multi-faceted mission is home to more than 15 career fields including business administration, cybersecurity, program management, communications, data science. We play a vital role in protecting the homeland. Please visit our official website (cisa.gov) to learn how you can contribute to our mission. Review our full Comment Policy: cisa.gov/comment-policy Review DHS LinkedIn Privacy Policy: dhs.gov/linkedin-privacy-policy-and-notice
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
CISA Risk Score (AI oriented)Between 0 and 549
CISA
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CISA Company CyberSecurity News & History
Past Incidents
17
Attack Types
5
CISA
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faced a tumultuous period marked by significant breaches, including the Salt Typhoon espionage campaign linked to Beijing, which compromised American telecoms, collecting sensitive data such as call logs, recordings, and potential location information. The largest hack in US telecom history occurred under the leadership of Jen Easterly, who was not asked to stay post-Inauguration Day. Her departure coincided with demands for CISA to become 'smaller' and 'more nimble' and the dismissal of the Cyber Safety Review Board members who were investigating the breaches, potentially jeopardizing the agency’s future and national cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Multiple Government Agencies Warn of Long-Term, Potentially Large-Scale BRICKSTORM Malware Campaign by Chinese Hackers
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could bring to a war
Description: A new warning issued jointly by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security documents an ongoing campaign by Chinese hackers making use of the sophisticated BRICKSTORM malware to target public sector organizations and IT companies for long-term espionage purposes. The average dwell time for these documented breaches is a little over a year, and the total victim count is impossible to know at this point. The BRICKSTORM malware was first documented by Google security researchers in 2024 and is considered one of the most advanced current threats. It targets Windows and VMware vSphere environments and serves as a long-term backdoor for stealthy data exfiltration. It has numerous advanced obfuscation features and will also reinstall itself if removed or disrupted. Once inside a target network, the Chinese hackers look to capture legitimate credentials through various means and create hidden virtual machines to conceal their activities. Chinese hackers may have been active since 2022 Though BRICKSTORM first came to broad attention in 2024, the researchers believe the Chinese hackers may have been successfully running this campaign since as far back as 2022. The average dwell time among documented victims of the malware is 393 days. If true, this would mean the attackers had been actively penetrating targets with this approach for at least two years before even being detected by security resear
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Ukrainian Woman in US Custody for Aiding Russian NoName057 Hacker Group
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: **U.S. Indicts Ukrainian National for Role in Russian-Backed Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure** The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) has indicted 33-year-old Ukrainian national **Victoria Eduardovna Dubranova** (also known as "Vika," "Tory," and "SovaSonya") for her alleged involvement in cyberattacks targeting global critical infrastructure. Dubranova, extradited to the U.S. earlier this year, is accused of supporting two Russian-aligned hacking groups: **NoName057(16)** and **CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR)**, also referred to as **Z-Pentest**, both suspected of receiving backing from Russian state entities. Dubranova faces charges in two separate cases—one tied to CARR and another to NoName—and has pleaded not guilty. Her trial is scheduled for **2026**. While her extradition details remain undisclosed, authorities in **July 2025** dismantled over **100 servers** linked to NoName057(16) and arrested two individuals in **France and Spain**, though no direct connection to Dubranova has been publicly confirmed. The attacks were not financially motivated but instead aimed at **disrupting essential services**. CARR claimed responsibility for breaches of **U.S. drinking water systems**, causing spills and failures, as well as an attack on a **Los Angeles meat processing facility** that resulted in food spoilage and an ammonia leak. NoName057(16), meanwhile, deployed its custom **DDoSia tool** to take down government websites, recruiting global volunteers with cryptocurrency rewards and leaderboard incentives. The group’s infrastructure was reportedly built by **CISM**, a Russian state-sponsored IT group operating under a **2018 presidential order**. The DoJ alleges both groups received **direction and funding from Russian intelligence**, including a **GRU officer** who guided CARR’s targeting and paid for cybercriminal services. At its peak, CARR had over **100 members**, including minors, and an online following in the tens of thousands. The **U.S. State Department** is offering a **$2 million reward** for information leading to the identification or location of three key CARR associates: **Yuliya Pankratova, Denis Degtyarenko, and "Cyber_1ce_Killer"**, the latter linked to a GRU officer. Dubranova faces severe penalties—up to **27 years** in the CARR case for conspiracy, damaging protected systems, fraud, and identity theft, and a **five-year maximum** in the NoName case for a separate conspiracy charge. The indictment underscores how **cybercriminal networks exploit geopolitical tensions**, operating across borders even as traditional conflicts persist. Similar operations in **2025** saw the arrest of the suspected administrator of **XSS.IS**, a major Russian-language cybercrime forum with alleged intelligence ties, during a **joint French-Ukrainian Europol operation**. In **2024**, Ukrainian authorities detained a **cryptor-developer** accused of aiding **Conti and LockBit ransomware groups** by creating tools to evade antivirus detection.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: The lapse of the **Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015)** and the **State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program**, combined with a **staffing reduction to under 900 employees** (from ~2,500) due to government funding expiration, has left CISA critically under-resourced. Without liability protections for private-sector threat-sharing, companies may hesitate to report cyber threats, increasing systemic vulnerabilities. The absence of grant funding further weakens state/local defenses (e.g., hospitals, schools, water systems), raising risks of cascading disruptions. Experts warn of **potential major cyberattacks** during this period, with CISA lacking sufficient personnel to respond effectively. Legal uncertainties (e.g., antitrust exposure, FOIA disclosures) and reduced real-time intelligence-sharing exacerbate the threat landscape, particularly for critical infrastructure. Senators and industry leaders emphasize the urgency of reauthorization, citing risks to **national/economic security**, but partisan delays persist.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: The U.S. government shutdown has severely weakened **CISA**, the nation’s leading civilian cybersecurity agency, by furloughing **65% of its 2,540-strong workforce** (1,651 employees) and issuing **Reductions in Force (RIF) notices** that may lead to permanent layoffs. Critical divisions like the **Infrastructure Security Division (ISD)**, responsible for protecting power grids, water treatment plants, and chemical facilities, face deep cuts—including the elimination of the **Chemical Security subdivision**, which secured high-risk chemical sites from cyber-physical threats. The **Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED)**, which coordinates national and international cybersecurity partnerships, is also targeted. Experts warn that this reduction—amid rising **nation-state cyber threats, ransomware, and misinformation campaigns**—creates exploitable blind spots, crippling the U.S. government’s ability to **detect, respond, and recover** from attacks. The shutdown and political redirection of CISA’s mission (e.g., accusations of censorship) further destabilize its operational capacity, leaving **critical infrastructure (energy, water, chemical sectors) vulnerable to cyberattacks** that could disrupt essential services or trigger cascading failures. The long-term impact includes **eroded national resilience**, increased risk of **state-sponsored espionage or sabotage**, and potential **physical harm** if industrial control systems (e.g., power grids, water treatment) are compromised.
CISA
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: As a relatively new and essential cyber-security component of the DHS, CISA faces a significant potential setback. With changing political climates and Trump’s apparent intentions to reshape the agency, its core missions of protecting government systems and supporting private and nonprofit entities could be compromised. Employees fear that reduced corporate oversight and a possible dismantling or repurposing of the agency may impair its ability to safeguard against cyber threats, potentially weakening national cybersecurity infrastructure. There is a palpable fear among the staff of a decline in efficacy and a change in direction that could pose threats not just to the agency's mandate but also to the broader security landscape.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: CISA faces potential undermining from elements within the Heritage Foundation who seek to scale back its operations, especially concerning its role in mitigating misinformation online. This approach could significantly weaken the agency, impacting its principal cybersecurity functions and potentially affecting its efforts to combat foreign propaganda. If the 2024 election leads to an administration aligning with the Project 2025 playbook, CISA could experience reduced effectiveness or an existential crisis. Such a shift could have far-reaching consequences for national cybersecurity and the protection against online falsehoods that threaten societal stability.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Discontinuation of CISA’s mobile app security program untimely, lawmaker says
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: **Cybersecurity Subcommittee Chair Opposes CISA’s Mobile App Vetting Program Shutdown After Salt Typhoon Attack** Rep. Andrew Garbarino (R-N.Y.), chair of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, has voiced strong opposition to the planned termination of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) Mobile App Vetting (MAV) Program. The move follows the **Salt Typhoon** cyberattack, which targeted U.S. telecommunications firms and impacted federal agencies, raising concerns about mobile device security vulnerabilities. In a letter to **Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem**, Garbarino argued that ending the MAV program would leave a critical gap in assessing mobile device risks and undermine confidence among **Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies**, which remain on high alert due to the fallout from Salt Typhoon. He also called for a **priority review of CISA’s role as the sector risk management agency for telecommunications**, emphasizing the need for stronger oversight in light of recent threats. Garbarino has demanded that DHS provide a **justification for the program’s termination** and outline **CISA’s updated strategy for securing the telecommunications sector** by **June 13**. The request underscores growing congressional scrutiny over federal cybersecurity measures in the wake of high-profile attacks.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack limited on finance or reputation
Description: In order to assist critical infrastructure organizations in thwarting ransomware gang attacks, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released new information detailing security flaws and configuration errors that ransomware gangs have exploited. This information was made public by CISA as part of the Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) program, and said that it would notify critical infrastructure organizations of any ransomware-vulnerable devices found on its network. Since its launch, CISA's RVWP has found and exchanged information about more than 800 susceptible systems with internet-accessible flaws regularly targeted by various ransomware activities. The U.S. cybersecurity agency has also released a dedicated website, StopRansomware.gov, which acts as the focal point for CISA's initiative to give defenders all the information they need to anticipate and neutralize ransomware assaults.
Critical Infrastructure Organizations (as warned by CISA, FBI, and ACSC)
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: In January 2023, the **BianLian ransomware group** shifted its tactics from encrypting files to **data theft-based extortion**, leveraging stolen **Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials**—often obtained via phishing or initial access brokers. The group deployed **custom Go-based backdoors**, remote management tools, and credential-harvesting utilities to infiltrate networks undetected. Once inside, they exfiltrated sensitive data and threatened to publish it on a **leak site**, demanding ransom payments in cryptocurrency. To evade security measures, BianLian **disabled antivirus processes** using PowerShell and Windows Command Shell, escalating risks for targeted organizations. The attack posed severe threats to **critical infrastructure sectors**, prompting warnings from **CISA, FBI, and ACSC**. Victim organizations faced potential **operational disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage**, with stolen data ranging from **employee records to proprietary business information**. While no specific company was named, the group’s focus on **high-value targets**—such as healthcare, energy, or government-adjacent entities—suggested systemic risks. Mitigations included **auditing RDP access, restricting PowerShell, and enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA)**, but the breach’s scale and sophistication highlighted vulnerabilities in defensive postures.
CISA
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), created in 2018, faces uncertain times as the return of former President Trump could significantly alter its function and direction. Trump's promises to reduce government spending and oversight have CISA staffers concerned about the potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives and a shift in focus toward immigration enforcement. The agency, which has a reputation for bipartisanship and was involved in election security and countering online misinformation, now finds itself at odds with Republican claims of censorship and surveillance. The fear of policy reversal and mission compromise looms among the employees, who remain dedicated to protecting national cyber infrastructure.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: Amid rising cyber threats, the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 proposes to significantly reduce the scope of CISA, which could undermine the agency's ability to protect against cyber attacks and misinformation. This move aligns with former President Trump's agenda and his critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation. If implemented, CISA's counter-misinformation efforts would be halted, its relationship with social media firms would change, and its cyber defense responsibilities could be redistributed to military and intelligence agencies. As a result, the United States could face an increased risk of cyber threats that can disrupt societal stability, influence elections, or compromise sensitive information.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: DHS had a privacy incident that resulted in the exposure of information for 247,167 active and retired federal employees. The database utilised by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and kept in the Department of Homeland Security OIG Case Management System was compromised by a data breach. Employee names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, jobs, grades, and duty locations are among the data that has been made public. In addition to putting additional security measures in place to restrict access to this kind of information, the Department of Homeland Security notified those who were impacted through notification letters.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: In March–May 2023, a misconfigured **DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN-Intel)** platform exposed **sensitive but unclassified intelligence data**—including investigative leads shared with the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, and local law enforcement—to **tens of thousands of unauthorized users**. The access controls were incorrectly set to 'everyone,' granting visibility to **non-intelligence government workers (e.g., disaster response teams), private contractors, and foreign government personnel**. The breach stemmed from **poor access management and lack of segmentation**, highlighting systemic failures in cloud security governance. While no classified data was compromised, the exposure risked operational security, counterterrorism efforts, and trust in interagency intelligence-sharing. The incident underscored how **human error and process gaps**—rather than sophisticated cyberattacks—remain a dominant cause of high-impact breaches in critical infrastructure.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Data Leak
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: A Department of Justice employee's email account was compromised by a hacker, who took 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees. Delving deeper into the archive, one finds information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence. Motherboard claims that a hacker gained access to a Department of Justice employee's email account. As evidence, the hacker used the hacked account to send the email directly to Motherboard contributor Joseph Cox. The apparent job titles, names, phone numbers, and email addresses of over 9,000 purported Department of Homeland Security (DHS) workers and over 20,000 purported FBI employees.
US Federal Agencies
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: Daniil Kasatkin, a 26-year-old Russian professional basketball player, was arrested at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris on June 21, 2023, for his alleged involvement in a ransomware gang that operated between 2020 and 2022. The gang is accused of targeting around 900 organizations, including two US federal agencies. Kasatkin is facing charges of 'conspiracy to commit computer fraud' and 'computer fraud conspiracy.' His lawyers deny the allegations, claiming he is not tech-savvy and was unaware of any unlawful activities. The US has not yet released any statements or evidence regarding the crimes.
Department of Homeland Security
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: The DHS encountered growing threats from commercial drones being modified to carry hazardous payloads, impacting national security. Attempted mitigations include improved detection and response capabilities through local law enforcement training and technology deployment. These clandestine drone activities pose a significant risk, requiring urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
CISA Company Scoring based on AI Models
Cyber Incidents Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
A.I Risk Score Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
Underwriter Stats for CISA
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Average (This Year)
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has 370.59% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs All-Companies Average (This Year)
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has 412.82% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident Types CISA vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency reported 4 incidents this year: 3 cyber attacks, 0 ransomware, 0 vulnerabilities, 1 data breaches, compared to industry peers with at least 1 incident.
Incident History — CISA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
CISA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
CISA Company Subsidiaries
NOTICE: This social media account will not be actively managed during the lapse in federal funding. We will not be able to respond or update until after funding is enacted. go.dhs.gov/lapse-2025 We lead the National effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to our cyber and physical infrastructure. Our multi-faceted mission is home to more than 15 career fields including business administration, cybersecurity, program management, communications, data science. We play a vital role in protecting the homeland. Please visit our official website (cisa.gov) to learn how you can contribute to our mission. Review our full Comment Policy: cisa.gov/comment-policy Review DHS LinkedIn Privacy Policy: dhs.gov/linkedin-privacy-policy-and-notice
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CISA CyberSecurity News
December 18, 2025 05:01 AM
CISA Flags Critical ASUS Live Update Flaw After Evidence of Active Exploitation
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Wednesday added a critical flaw impacting ASUS Live Update to its Known...
December 18, 2025 02:30 AM
Fortinet CVEs exploited in the wild
Security teams are being urged to act immediately following confirmation that two newly disclosed Fortinet vulnerabilities are being...
December 18, 2025 01:51 AM
CISA Updates Critical Infrastructure Cyber Goals
DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has updated its Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals.
December 18, 2025 12:59 AM
Cybersecurity prioritization sought by retiring GAO leader
FedScoop reports that Gene Dodaro, retiring comptroller general of the Government Accountability Office, has warned senators that both...
December 17, 2025 04:29 PM
FortiGate devices targeted with malicious SSO logins
Researchers discovered threat activity less than a week after Fortinet disclosed critical vulnerabilities in multiple products.
December 17, 2025 01:59 PM
PRC State-Sponsored Hackers Use BRICKSTORM Malware, Warns Joint Advisory
Western cybersecurity agencies are warning that hackers linked to the People's Republic of China are deploying a stealthy malware strain to...
December 17, 2025 11:50 AM
CISA Unveils Enhanced Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released version 2.0 of its Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals...
December 17, 2025 11:41 AM
Elastic Partners With CISA to Help Standardize Cyber Defense Across Federal Civilian Agencies
Elastic, the Search AI Company, has announced that it is partnering with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to...
December 16, 2025 09:36 PM
Outgoing GAO chief warns of ‘taking our foot off the gas’ at CISA
Gene Dodaro, who is set to retire from the watchdog at the end of this month, shared final concerns with senators Tuesday about how the...
Frequently Asked Questions
Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
CISA CyberSecurity History Information
Official Website of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
The official website of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is http://www.cisa.gov.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s AI-Generated Cybersecurity Score
According to Rankiteo, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 511, reflecting their Critical security posture.
How many security badges does Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’ have ?
According to Rankiteo, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
Does Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency have SOC 2 Type 1 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
Does Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency have SOC 2 Type 2 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
Does Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency comply with GDPR ?
According to Rankiteo, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is not listed as GDPR compliant.
Does Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency have PCI DSS certification ?
According to Rankiteo, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
Does Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency comply with HIPAA ?
According to Rankiteo, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
Does Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency have ISO 27001 certification ?
According to Rankiteo,Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Industry Classification of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency operates primarily in the Government Administration industry.
Number of Employees at Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency employs approximately 1,741 people worldwide.
Subsidiaries Owned by Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s LinkedIn Followers
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 586,152 followers.
NAICS Classification of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is classified under the NAICS code 92, which corresponds to Public Administration.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Presence on Crunchbase
No, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Presence on LinkedIn
Yes, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/cisagov.
Cybersecurity Incidents Involving Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
As of December 21, 2025, Rankiteo reports that Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has experienced 17 cybersecurity incidents.
Number of Peer and Competitor Companies
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has an estimated 11,755 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
What types of cybersecurity incidents have occurred at Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ?
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Data Leak, Cyber Attack, Vulnerability, Breach and Ransomware.
How does Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency detect and respond to cybersecurity incidents ?
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an remediation measures with notification letters sent to affected individuals, remediation measures with additional security measures implemented to restrict access to information, and containment measures with improved detection and response capabilities, containment measures with local law enforcement training, containment measures with technology deployment, and and and containment measures with auditing rdp usage, containment measures with disabling command-line scripting, containment measures with restricting powershell, and remediation measures with enforcing strong authentication (e.g., mfa), remediation measures with patching vulnerable systems, and communication strategy with warnings issued by cisa, fbi, and acsc, and communication strategy with foia disclosure (dhs memo), communication strategy with media reports (wired), and network segmentation with recommended as corrective action, and enhanced monitoring with recommended as corrective action, and third party assistance with cyber threat alliance (information-sharing coordination), third party assistance with internet security alliance (advocacy for policy updates), and remediation measures with sen. gary peters' 10-year cisa 2015 reauthorization bill (protecting america from cyber threats act), remediation measures with house homeland security committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by rep. andrew garbarino), remediation measures with proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, ai threats), remediation measures with incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by internet security alliance), and recovery measures with short-term extensions via continuing resolution (cr) in house/senate bills, recovery measures with potential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles, and communication strategy with sen. peters' public warnings about national/economic security risks, communication strategy with media outreach by cyber threat alliance and internet security alliance, communication strategy with house democratic staffer comments on program success in state/local governments, and communication strategy with public warnings by cybersecurity experts, communication strategy with media coverage highlighting risks, and enhanced monitoring with heightened alert about cybersecurity posture of mobile devices, and law enforcement notified with yes..
Incident Details
Can you provide details on each incident ?
Title: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program
Description: CISA released new information detailing security flaws and configuration errors exploited by ransomware gangs to assist critical infrastructure organizations in thwarting ransomware attacks.
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Vulnerability ExploitationConfiguration Errors
Vulnerability Exploited: Internet-accessible flaws
Motivation: Ransomware
Title: Department of Justice Email Account Compromise
Description: A Department of Justice employee's email account was compromised by a hacker, who took 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees. The data included information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Email Compromise
Threat Actor: Hacker
Motivation: Data Theft
Title: DHS Data Breach Incident
Description: A privacy incident at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) resulted in the exposure of information for 247,167 active and retired federal employees. The compromised data includes employee names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, positions, grades, and duty locations. The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Case Management System was affected.
Type: Data Breach
Title: Potential Undermining of CISA by Heritage Foundation
Description: CISA faces potential undermining from elements within the Heritage Foundation who seek to scale back its operations, especially concerning its role in mitigating misinformation online. This approach could significantly weaken the agency, impacting its principal cybersecurity functions and potentially affecting its efforts to combat foreign propaganda. If the 2024 election leads to an administration aligning with the Project 2025 playbook, CISA could experience reduced effectiveness or an existential crisis. Such a shift could have far-reaching consequences for national cybersecurity and the protection against online falsehoods that threaten societal stability.
Type: Operational Undermining
Attack Vector: Political Influence
Threat Actor: Heritage Foundation
Motivation: Political
Title: Proposed Reduction of CISA's Scope by Heritage Foundation's Project 2025
Description: The Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 proposes to significantly reduce the scope of CISA, which could undermine the agency's ability to protect against cyber attacks and misinformation. This move aligns with former President Trump's agenda and his critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation. If implemented, CISA's counter-misinformation efforts would be halted, its relationship with social media firms would change, and its cyber defense responsibilities could be redistributed to military and intelligence agencies. As a result, the United States could face an increased risk of cyber threats that can disrupt societal stability, influence elections, or compromise sensitive information.
Type: Policy Change
Threat Actor: Heritage Foundation's Project 2025
Motivation: Align with former President Trump's agenda and critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation.
Title: Potential Setback in CISA's Cybersecurity Operations
Description: As a relatively new and essential cyber-security component of the DHS, CISA faces a significant potential setback. With changing political climates and Trump’s apparent intentions to reshape the agency, its core missions of protecting government systems and supporting private and nonprofit entities could be compromised. Employees fear that reduced corporate oversight and a possible dismantling or repurposing of the agency may impair its ability to safeguard against cyber threats, potentially weakening national cybersecurity infrastructure. There is a palpable fear among the staff of a decline in efficacy and a change in direction that could pose threats not just to the agency's mandate but also to the broader security landscape.
Type: Organizational Change Impacting Cybersecurity
Threat Actor: Political ClimateTrump Administration
Motivation: Reshaping AgencyReduced Corporate Oversight
Title: Potential Policy Reversal and Mission Compromise at CISA
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), created in 2018, faces uncertain times as the return of former President Trump could significantly alter its function and direction. Trump's promises to reduce government spending and oversight have CISA staffers concerned about the potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives and a shift in focus toward immigration enforcement. The agency, which has a reputation for bipartisanship and was involved in election security and countering online misinformation, now finds itself at odds with Republican claims of censorship and surveillance. The fear of policy reversal and mission compromise looms among the employees, who remain dedicated to protecting national cyber infrastructure.
Type: Policy and Mission Compromise
Threat Actor: Political Leadership Changes
Motivation: Reduction in government spending and oversight, shift in focus toward immigration enforcement
Title: Commercial Drone Threats to National Security
Description: The DHS encountered growing threats from commercial drones being modified to carry hazardous payloads, impacting national security. Attempted mitigations include improved detection and response capabilities through local law enforcement training and technology deployment. These clandestine drone activities pose a significant risk, requiring urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
Type: Physical Security Threat
Attack Vector: Modified Commercial Drones
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats
Motivation: Impact national security and critical infrastructure
Title: Salt Typhoon Espionage Campaign
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faced a tumultuous period marked by significant breaches, including the Salt Typhoon espionage campaign linked to Beijing, which compromised American telecoms, collecting sensitive data such as call logs, recordings, and potential location information. The largest hack in US telecom history occurred under the leadership of Jen Easterly, who was not asked to stay post-Inauguration Day. Her departure coincided with demands for CISA to become 'smaller' and 'more nimble' and the dismissal of the Cyber Safety Review Board members who were investigating the breaches, potentially jeopardizing the agency’s future and national cybersecurity.
Type: Espionage Campaign
Attack Vector: Unknown
Threat Actor: Beijing
Motivation: Espionage
Title: Russian Basketball Player Arrested for Ransomware Negotiation
Description: Daniil Kasatkin, a professional basketball player, was arrested in France for allegedly acting as a negotiator for a ransomware gang that targeted around 900 organizations, including two US federal agencies.
Date Detected: 2023-06-21
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Ransomware Negotiation
Threat Actor: Unnamed Ransomware Gang
Motivation: Financial Gain
Title: BianLian Ransomware Group Shifts to Data Theft-Based Extortion (2023)
Description: In January 2023, the BianLian ransomware group transitioned from file encryption to data theft-based extortion after a decryption tool was released by Avast. The group, active since June 2022, gains network access via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, often obtained through phishing or initial access brokers. They deploy custom Go-based backdoors, remote management software, and tools for reconnaissance and credential harvesting. BianLian threatens to publish exfiltrated data on a leak site and demands ransom in cryptocurrency. To evade detection, they disable antivirus processes using PowerShell and Windows Command Shell. Warnings have been issued by CISA, FBI, and ACSC to critical infrastructure organizations. Mitigations include auditing RDP usage, restricting PowerShell, and enforcing strong authentication.
Date Detected: 2022-06
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-01
Type: ransomware
Attack Vector: Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) exploitationphishinginitial access brokers (IAB)custom Go-based backdoorsremote management software
Vulnerability Exploited: weak RDP credentialslack of multi-factor authentication (MFA)unrestricted PowerShell usagedisabled antivirus processes
Threat Actor: BianLian ransomware group
Motivation: financial gaindata extortion
Title: DHS Data Hub Misconfiguration Exposes Sensitive Intelligence to Unauthorized Users
Description: An internal DHS memo obtained via FOIA revealed that from March to May 2023, a DHS online platform (HSIN-Intel) used to share sensitive but unclassified intelligence was misconfigured, granting access to 'everyone' instead of only authorized users. This exposed restricted intelligence to tens of thousands of unauthorized users, including non-intelligence government workers, private contractors, and foreign government staff. The incident highlights systemic failures in cloud security, including misconfigurations tied to overly permissive IAM policies, lack of segmentation, and poor access management. Additionally, a separate 2025 breach exposed 184 million plain-text user records (including credentials for Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), emphasizing the broader crisis of cloud misconfigurations driven by human error, lack of expertise, and poor governance.
Date Detected: 2023-05-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-06-01
Type: Data Exposure
Attack Vector: Misconfigured Access ControlsOverly Permissive IAM PoliciesPublicly Exposed Storage
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Public Access ConfigurationLack of SegmentationDisabled LoggingMissing Alerts
Title: Lapse of Federal Cybersecurity Programs Increases Vulnerability to Cyberattacks
Description: The expiration of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015) and the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, combined with reduced staffing at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) due to a government funding lapse, has heightened concerns about the U.S.'s vulnerability to cyberattacks. The lapse removes liability protections for companies sharing cyber-threat information, discouraging collaboration and leaving critical infrastructure at risk. Key stakeholders, including Sen. Gary Peters, have warned of potential national and economic security risks, while efforts to reauthorize the programs face political hurdles. The reduced CISA workforce may also limit the agency's ability to respond effectively to a major incident.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-10-01
Type: Policy/Regulatory Failure
Vulnerability Exploited: Lapse of CISA 2015 liability protectionsReduced CISA staffing (from ~2,500 to <900)Expiration of State and Local Cybersecurity Grant ProgramLack of real-time threat-sharing incentives
Title: Potential Cybersecurity Risks Due to CISA Downsizing Amid Government Shutdown
Description: As the U.S. government shutdown continues, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faces significant workforce reductions, budget cuts, and potential permanent downsizing. This creates heightened cybersecurity risks, as CISA—responsible for coordinating national cyber defense, protecting critical infrastructure, and combating threats from hackers, cybercriminals, and nation-states—operates with reduced capacity. Over 1,000 employees have already left CISA this year, with further Reductions in Force (RIFs) underway. Key divisions like the Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED) and Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) are targeted, raising concerns about blind spots in threat detection, response, and recovery. Political disputes and misinformation-related controversies have also contributed to the agency's challenges, despite its critical role in national defense.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-10-01
Type: Operational Risk
Vulnerability Exploited: Reduced Workforce CapacityBudget ConstraintsPolitical DistractionsDelayed Threat Response
Threat Actor: Nation-State ActorsCybercriminalsHacktivistsOpportunistic Hackers
Motivation: Exploit Government VulnerabilitiesDisrupt Critical InfrastructureLeverage Political InstabilityCapitalize on Reduced Oversight
Title: BRICKSTORM Malware Campaign by Chinese Hackers
Description: An ongoing campaign by Chinese hackers using the sophisticated BRICKSTORM malware to target public sector organizations and IT companies for long-term espionage purposes. The malware targets Windows and VMware vSphere environments, serving as a long-term backdoor for stealthy data exfiltration with advanced obfuscation features and self-reinstallation capabilities.
Date Detected: 2024
Type: Espionage
Attack Vector: Malware (BRICKSTORM)
Threat Actor: Chinese hackers
Motivation: Espionage
Title: Salt Typhoon Hack Impacting U.S. Telecommunications Firms and Federal Agencies
Description: The Salt Typhoon hack targeted U.S. telecommunications firms, impacting federal agencies. This incident has led to concerns about the cessation of CISA's Mobile App Vetting Program and prompted a review of CISA's role in the telecommunications sector.
Type: Cyber Espionage
Threat Actor: Salt Typhoon
Motivation: Espionage
Title: Indictment of Victoria Eduardovna Dubranova for Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure
Description: The US Justice Department has indicted Ukrainian national Victoria Eduardovna Dubranova for her alleged role in cyberattacks aimed at disrupting critical infrastructure worldwide. Dubranova is accused of supporting Russian-aligned hacking groups NoName057(16) and CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR), which are believed to have backing from Russian state entities.
Type: Cyberattack
Attack Vector: DDoSCustom DDoS Tool (DDoSia)Hacking
Threat Actor: NoName057(16)CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR)GRU (Russian Military Intelligence)
Motivation: PoliticalDisruption of Critical Services
What are the most common types of attacks the company has faced ?
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Cyber Attack.
How does the company identify the attack vectors used in incidents ?
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Email Account, RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs) and Misconfigured HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach).
Impact of the Incidents
What was the impact of each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware CYB2047151023
Systems Affected: More than 800 susceptible systems
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Data Compromised: 200gb of data, including records of 20,000 fbi workers and 9,000 dhs employees, Information about dhs security experts, programme analysts, it, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence
Brand Reputation Impact: High
Identity Theft Risk: High
Incident : Data Breach USD331181223
Data Compromised: Employee names, Social security numbers, Dates of birth, Positions, Grades, Duty locations
Systems Affected: DHS OIG Case Management System
Incident : Operational Undermining CIS000080624
Operational Impact: Reduced effectiveness or existential crisis
Incident : Organizational Change Impacting Cybersecurity CIS000122124
Systems Affected: Government Systems
Operational Impact: Potential Decline in Efficacy
Brand Reputation Impact: Weakening National Cybersecurity Infrastructure
Incident : Policy and Mission Compromise CIS000122224
Operational Impact: Potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Operational Impact: High
Incident : Espionage Campaign CIS001012825
Data Compromised: Call logs, Recordings, Potential location information
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Brand Reputation Impact: high (due to public leak threats and warnings from CISA/FBI/ACSC)
Identity Theft Risk: potential (if PII was exfiltrated)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Data Compromised: Sensitive intelligence (dhs), 184m user records (2025 breach), Plain-text credentials (apple, google, meta, etc.), Bank accounts, Health platforms, Government portals
Systems Affected: HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach)
Operational Impact: Unauthorized Access to Restricted IntelligenceIncreased Risk of Identity Theft/Phishing (2025 Breach)Credential Stuffing Attacks
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Trust in DHS/Federal AgenciesReputation Damage for Affected Platforms (Apple, Google, etc.)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (184M Records Exposed in Plain Text)']
Payment Information Risk: ['High (Bank Account Details Exposed in 2025 Breach)']
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Operational Impact: Reduced federal cybersecurity response capabilityDiscouraged private-sector information sharingIncreased legal/regulatory risks for companies sharing threat dataPotential delays in state/local government cybersecurity improvements
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of public trust in federal cybersecurity preparednessPerception of political dysfunction hindering cyber defense
Legal Liabilities: Loss of antitrust protections for threat-sharing companiesRisk of FOIA-disclosure of shared threat dataPotential regulatory fines for companies sharing information without protections
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Systems Affected: Critical Infrastructure (e.g., power grids, water treatment plants)Federal Cyber Defense SystemsThreat Intelligence Sharing Platforms
Operational Impact: Reduced Threat Detection CapabilitiesDelayed Incident ResponseWeakened Partnership CoordinationIncreased Risk of Successful Cyber Attacks
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Public Trust in Government CybersecurityPerception of Political Interference in National Security
Incident : Espionage CIS1765238766
Data Compromised: Credentials, sensitive data
Systems Affected: WindowsVMware vSphere
Operational Impact: Long-term backdoor access, stealthy data exfiltration
Incident : Cyber Espionage CIS1765251340
Systems Affected: Mobile devices
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Systems Affected: Water systemsFood supply chainsPublic servicesMeat processing facilitiesGovernment websites
Operational Impact: Major spillsSystem failuresAmmonia leakSpoilage of food
What types of data are most commonly compromised in incidents ?
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Job Titles, Phone Numbers, Email Addresses, , Personally Identifiable Information, , Call Logs, Recordings, Potential Location Information, , Intelligence Reports (Dhs), User Credentials (Plain Text), Bank Account Details, Health Data, Government Portal Access, , Credentials, Sensitive Data and .
Which entities were affected by each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware CYB2047151023
Entity Type: Critical Infrastructure Organizations
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Entity Name: Department of Justice
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Entity Name: FBI
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Breach USD331181223
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Government
Size: Large
Incident : Operational Undermining CIS000080624
Entity Name: CISA
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Incident : Policy Change CIS005080624
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Incident : Organizational Change Impacting Cybersecurity CIS000122124
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Incident : Policy and Mission Compromise CIS000122224
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Incident : Espionage Campaign CIS001012825
Entity Name: American Telecoms
Entity Type: Telecommunications
Industry: Telecommunications
Location: United States
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Entity Type: Organization
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Entity Type: critical infrastructure organizations
Location: United StatesAustraliaglobal (targeted warnings)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Customers Affected: Tens of thousands (HSIN users)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: Multiple Global Platforms (Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, etc.)
Entity Type: Tech Companies, Social Media, Cloud Providers
Industry: Technology
Location: Global
Size: Fortune 2000
Customers Affected: 184 million users (2025 Breach)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: FBI
Entity Type: Law Enforcement
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Entity Type: Intelligence Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: Local Law Enforcement & Intelligence Fusion Centers
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Safety
Location: United States
Size: Varies
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Entity Name: U.S. Federal Government (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Size: Large (reduced from ~2,500 to <900 employees during shutdown)
Customers Affected: All U.S. critical infrastructure sectors
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Entity Name: State and Local Governments (e.g., schools, hospitals, water systems)
Entity Type: Public Sector
Industry: Multiple (Education, Healthcare, Utilities)
Location: United States
Size: Varies
Customers Affected: Millions of U.S. residents reliant on public services
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Entity Name: Private-Sector Companies (e.g., Cyber Threat Alliance members)
Entity Type: Corporate
Industry: Multiple (Cybersecurity, Critical Infrastructure)
Location: United States (primarily)
Size: Varies
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Size: 2,540 employees (pre-reductions)
Customers Affected: U.S. Federal Government, State and Local Governments, Critical Infrastructure Operators, Private Sector Partners
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Entity Name: Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED)
Entity Type: Agency Division
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Customers Affected: National and International Partners
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Entity Name: Infrastructure Security Division (ISD)
Entity Type: Agency Division
Industry: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Power Grid Operators, Water Treatment Facilities, Chemical Security Facilities
Incident : Espionage CIS1765238766
Entity Type: Public sector organizations, IT companies
Industry: Government, Information Technology
Incident : Cyber Espionage CIS1765251340
Entity Name: U.S. Telecommunications Firms
Entity Type: Corporations
Industry: Telecommunications
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Federal agencies
Incident : Cyber Espionage CIS1765251340
Entity Name: Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) Agencies
Entity Type: Government Agencies
Industry: Government
Location: United States
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Entity Name: Multiple U.S. states' drinking water systems
Entity Type: Government/Utility
Industry: Water Supply
Location: United States
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Entity Name: Meat processing facility
Entity Type: Private
Industry: Food Processing
Location: Los Angeles, United States
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Entity Name: Government websites
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Sector
Location: Western countries
Response to the Incidents
What measures were taken in response to each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach USD331181223
Remediation Measures: Notification letters sent to affected individualsAdditional security measures implemented to restrict access to information
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Containment Measures: Improved detection and response capabilitiesLocal law enforcement trainingTechnology deployment
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Containment Measures: auditing RDP usagedisabling command-line scriptingrestricting PowerShell
Remediation Measures: enforcing strong authentication (e.g., MFA)patching vulnerable systems
Communication Strategy: warnings issued by CISA, FBI, and ACSC
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Communication Strategy: FOIA Disclosure (DHS Memo)Media Reports (WIRED)
Network Segmentation: ['Recommended as Corrective Action']
Enhanced Monitoring: Recommended as Corrective Action
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Third Party Assistance: Cyber Threat Alliance (Information-Sharing Coordination), Internet Security Alliance (Advocacy For Policy Updates).
Remediation Measures: Sen. Gary Peters' 10-year CISA 2015 reauthorization bill (Protecting America from Cyber Threats Act)House Homeland Security Committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by Rep. Andrew Garbarino)Proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, AI threats)Incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by Internet Security Alliance)
Recovery Measures: Short-term extensions via Continuing Resolution (CR) in House/Senate billsPotential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles
Communication Strategy: Sen. Peters' public warnings about national/economic security risksMedia outreach by Cyber Threat Alliance and Internet Security AllianceHouse Democratic staffer comments on program success in state/local governments
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Communication Strategy: Public Warnings by Cybersecurity ExpertsMedia Coverage Highlighting Risks
Incident : Cyber Espionage CIS1765251340
Enhanced Monitoring: Heightened alert about cybersecurity posture of mobile devices
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Law Enforcement Notified: Yes
How does the company involve third-party assistance in incident response ?
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through Cyber Threat Alliance (information-sharing coordination), Internet Security Alliance (advocacy for policy updates), .
Data Breach Information
What type of data was compromised in each breach ?
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Job titles, Phone numbers, Email addresses
Number of Records Exposed: 29,000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach USD331181223
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information
Number of Records Exposed: 247167
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: Employee namesSocial Security numbersDates of birthPositionsGradesDuty locations
Incident : Espionage Campaign CIS001012825
Type of Data Compromised: Call logs, Recordings, Potential location information
Sensitivity of Data: High
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Type of Data Compromised: Intelligence reports (dhs), User credentials (plain text), Bank account details, Health data, Government portal access
Number of Records Exposed: Undisclosed (DHS), 184 million (2025 Breach)
Sensitivity of Data: High (Intelligence/National Security)Critical (Financial/Health Data)
Data Exfiltration: Likely (2025 Breach)Unconfirmed (DHS)
Data Encryption: ['None (Plain-Text Records in 2025 Breach)']
File Types Exposed: Database RecordsAuthorization URLsCredentials
Personally Identifiable Information: UsernamesPasswordsBank Account DetailsHealth Records
Incident : Espionage CIS1765238766
Type of Data Compromised: Credentials, Sensitive data
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
What measures does the company take to prevent data exfiltration ?
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Notification letters sent to affected individuals, Additional security measures implemented to restrict access to information, , enforcing strong authentication (e.g., MFA), patching vulnerable systems, , Sen. Gary Peters' 10-year CISA 2015 reauthorization bill (Protecting America from Cyber Threats Act), House Homeland Security Committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by Rep. Andrew Garbarino), Proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, AI threats), Incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by Internet Security Alliance), .
How does the company handle incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) ?
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by improved detection and response capabilities, local law enforcement training, technology deployment, , auditing rdp usage, disabling command-line scripting, restricting powershell and .
Ransomware Information
Was ransomware involved in any of the incidents ?
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Ransom Demanded: True
Ransomware Strain: BianLian
Data Exfiltration: True
How does the company recover data encrypted by ransomware ?
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Short-term extensions via Continuing Resolution (CR) in House/Senate bills, Potential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles, .
Regulatory Compliance
Were there any regulatory violations and fines imposed for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Legal Actions: Pending Extradition to the US
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Regulatory Notifications: CISAFBIACSC warnings issued
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Regulations Violated: Potential FISMA (DHS), GDPR (if EU citizens affected in 2025 Breach), State Data Breach Laws,
Regulatory Notifications: FOIA Disclosure (DHS)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Regulations Violated: Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015),
Regulatory Notifications: Lapse of FOIA exemptions for shared threat dataLoss of antitrust protections for collaborating companies
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Legal Actions: Indictment, Conspiracy charges, Fraud charges, Identity theft charges,
How does the company ensure compliance with regulatory requirements ?
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Pending Extradition to the US, Indictment, Conspiracy charges, Fraud charges, Identity theft charges, .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What lessons were learned from each incident ?
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Lessons Learned: Urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies are necessary to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Lessons Learned: RDP remains a high-risk attack vector if not properly secured., Disabling antivirus processes via PowerShell is a common evasion tactic., Initial access brokers play a key role in facilitating ransomware attacks., Shift from encryption to extortion highlights the need for data protection beyond backups.
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Lessons Learned: Misconfigurations are systemic failures tied to people, process, and policy—not just technical oversights., Overly permissive IAM policies and lack of segmentation enable broad unauthorized access., Publicly exposed storage buckets/databases with sensitive data create high-risk vectors., Plain-text credential storage exacerbates identity theft and fraud risks., Cloud drift and lack of context in security tools lead to alert fatigue and missed critical issues., Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale.
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Lessons Learned: Short-term legislative patches are insufficient for cybersecurity operations requiring long-term certainty., Political objections (e.g., Sen. Rand Paul's conflation of CISA 2015 with the CISA agency) can derail critical cybersecurity measures., Corporate legal teams may hesitate to share threat data without liability protections, even if operational teams support collaboration., State/local cybersecurity grants have tangible impacts on community resilience (e.g., schools, hospitals)., CISA's reduced staffing during shutdowns creates systemic vulnerability to major incidents.
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Lessons Learned: Politicization of cybersecurity agencies undermines national defense capabilities., Workforce reductions in critical agencies create exploitable vulnerabilities during high-threat periods., Budget cuts to threat intelligence and infrastructure protection increase systemic risks., Public-private partnerships require stable, well-funded government coordination to be effective.
What recommendations were made to prevent future incidents ?
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Recommendations: Improve detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threatsImprove detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threatsImprove detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Recommendations: Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Recommendations: Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Recommendations: Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Recommendations: Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.
Incident : Cyber Espionage CIS1765251340
Recommendations: Review CISA's role as a sector risk management agency for the telecommunications industry; Justify the Mobile App Vetting Program's termination and detail CISA's updated plan for the telecommunications industry
What are the key lessons learned from past incidents ?
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies are necessary to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.RDP remains a high-risk attack vector if not properly secured.,Disabling antivirus processes via PowerShell is a common evasion tactic.,Initial access brokers play a key role in facilitating ransomware attacks.,Shift from encryption to extortion highlights the need for data protection beyond backups.Misconfigurations are systemic failures tied to people, process, and policy—not just technical oversights.,Overly permissive IAM policies and lack of segmentation enable broad unauthorized access.,Publicly exposed storage buckets/databases with sensitive data create high-risk vectors.,Plain-text credential storage exacerbates identity theft and fraud risks.,Cloud drift and lack of context in security tools lead to alert fatigue and missed critical issues.,Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale.Short-term legislative patches are insufficient for cybersecurity operations requiring long-term certainty.,Political objections (e.g., Sen. Rand Paul's conflation of CISA 2015 with the CISA agency) can derail critical cybersecurity measures.,Corporate legal teams may hesitate to share threat data without liability protections, even if operational teams support collaboration.,State/local cybersecurity grants have tangible impacts on community resilience (e.g., schools, hospitals).,CISA's reduced staffing during shutdowns creates systemic vulnerability to major incidents.Politicization of cybersecurity agencies undermines national defense capabilities.,Workforce reductions in critical agencies create exploitable vulnerabilities during high-threat periods.,Budget cuts to threat intelligence and infrastructure protection increase systemic risks.,Public-private partnerships require stable, well-funded government coordination to be effective.
What recommendations has the company implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Review CISA's role as a sector risk management agency for the telecommunications industry; Justify the Mobile App Vetting Program's termination and detail CISA's updated plan for the telecommunications industry.
References
Where can I find more information about each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware CYB2047151023
Source: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Source: Motherboard
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Source: AFP
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Source: CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Source: FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Source: ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Source: Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: WIRED
URL: https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/
Date Accessed: 2023-06-01
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher)
Date Accessed: 2025-06-01
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security Vulnerabilities
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: CrowdStrike - Common Cloud Misconfigurations
URL: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/
Date Accessed: 2023-01-01
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration Prevention
URL: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: SecPod - Top 10 Cloud Misconfigurations
URL: https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: Politico
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: House Homeland Security Committee
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Source: ClearanceJobs
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Source: SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO)
Incident : Espionage CIS1765238766
Source: CISA, NSA, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Incident : Espionage CIS1765238766
Source: Google security researchers
Incident : Cyber Espionage CIS1765251340
Source: CyberScoop
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Source: US Department of Justice
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Source: Reward for Justice (US State Department)
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Source: Courthouse News
Where can stakeholders find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) ProgramUrl: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware, and Source: Motherboard, and Source: AFP, and Source: CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware, and Source: FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics, and Source: ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat, and Source: Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023), and Source: WIREDUrl: https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/Date Accessed: 2023-06-01, and Source: Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher)Date Accessed: 2025-06-01, and Source: Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security VulnerabilitiesUrl: https://www.wiz.io/academy/top-cloud-vulnerabilities, and Source: CrowdStrike - Common Cloud MisconfigurationsUrl: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/Date Accessed: 2023-01-01, and Source: SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration PreventionUrl: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/, and Source: SecPod - Top 10 Cloud MisconfigurationsUrl: https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/, and Source: Politico, and Source: Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements, and Source: Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel), and Source: Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton), and Source: House Homeland Security Committee, and Source: ClearanceJobs, and Source: SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO), and Source: CISA, NSA, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, and Source: Google security researchers, and Source: CyberScoop, and Source: US Department of Justice, and Source: Reward for Justice (US State Department), and Source: Courthouse News.
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the investigation for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Investigation Status: Ongoing
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Investigation Status: ongoing (warnings active as of 2023)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Investigation Status: ['DHS Internal Inquiry Completed (2023)', '2025 Breach Under Investigation']
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Investigation Status: Ongoing (political/legislative; no technical investigation)
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (Political and Operational Review)
Incident : Espionage CIS1765238766
Investigation Status: Ongoing
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Investigation Status: Ongoing
How does the company communicate the status of incident investigations to stakeholders ?
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Warnings Issued By Cisa, Fbi, And Acsc, Foia Disclosure (Dhs Memo), Media Reports (Wired), Sen. Peters' Public Warnings About National/Economic Security Risks, Media Outreach By Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance, House Democratic Staffer Comments On Program Success In State/Local Governments, Public Warnings By Cybersecurity Experts and Media Coverage Highlighting Risks.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
Were there any advisories issued to stakeholders or customers for each incident ?
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Stakeholder Advisories: Cisa, Fbi, Acsc.
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Stakeholder Advisories: Foia Memo (Dhs), Media Statements.
Customer Advisories: None (DHS)Recommended Password Resets for 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Stakeholder Advisories: Sen. Peters' Warnings To Reporters About National Security Risks., Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance Statements On Information-Sharing Impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican Aide Comments On Cr Extensions., House Democratic Staffer Remarks On State/Local Grant Program Success..
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Stakeholder Advisories: Cybersecurity Experts Warn Of Increased Risks Due To Cisa'S Reduced Capacity., Private Sector Partners Advised To Bolster Independent Defenses Amid Government Instability..
What advisories does the company provide to stakeholders and customers following an incident ?
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Cisa, Fbi, Acsc, Foia Memo (Dhs), Media Statements, None (Dhs), Recommended Password Resets For 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach), , Sen. Peters' Warnings To Reporters About National Security Risks., Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance Statements On Information-Sharing Impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican Aide Comments On Cr Extensions., House Democratic Staffer Remarks On State/Local Grant Program Success., Cybersecurity Experts Warn Of Increased Risks Due To Cisa'S Reduced Capacity. and Private Sector Partners Advised To Bolster Independent Defenses Amid Government Instability..
Initial Access Broker
How did the initial access broker gain entry for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Entry Point: Email Account
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Entry Point: RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs)
Backdoors Established: ['custom Go-based backdoors', 'remote management software']
High Value Targets: Critical Infrastructure Organizations,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Critical Infrastructure Organizations,
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entry Point: Misconfigured Hsin-Intel Platform (Dhs), Unsecured Database (2025 Breach),
High Value Targets: Intelligence Data (Dhs), User Credentials (2025 Breach),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Intelligence Data (Dhs), User Credentials (2025 Breach),
Incident : Espionage CIS1765238766
Backdoors Established: Yes (BRICKSTORM malware)
Post-Incident Analysis
What were the root causes and corrective actions taken for each incident ?
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Root Causes: Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats
Corrective Actions: Improve Detection And Response Capabilities, Enhance Local Law Enforcement Training, Deploy Advanced Technologies To Mitigate Drone Threats,
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Root Causes: Weak Or Stolen Rdp Credentials, Lack Of Mfa On Critical Access Points, Unrestricted Use Of Powershell For Scripting, Insufficient Monitoring For Data Exfiltration,
Corrective Actions: Enforce Mfa For All Remote Access., Disable Unnecessary Rdp Exposure To The Internet., Restrict Powershell To Administrative Use Only., Deploy Endpoint Detection And Response (Edr) Tools To Monitor For Malicious Activity., Conduct Regular Audits Of High-Privilege Accounts.,
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Root Causes: Overly Permissive Iam Policies ('Everyone' Access)., Lack Of Network Segmentation (Dhs)., Disabled Logging/Missing Alerts (No Detection Of Unauthorized Access)., Human Error In Access Configuration (Hsin-Intel)., Plain-Text Storage Of Credentials (2025 Breach)., Complex Cloud Architectures Without Adequate Governance., Shadow It/Unmonitored Accounts (Potential Factor)., Inadequate Policy-As-Code Enforcement.,
Corrective Actions: Revised Iam Policies With Least-Privilege Principles., Implemented Network Segmentation For Hsin Platforms., Enabled Centralized Logging And Monitoring (Dhs)., Mandated Encryption For Sensitive Data (Post-2025 Breach)., Conducted Staff Training On Secure Cloud Configurations., Deployed Automated Misconfiguration Detection Tools., Established Regular Audits For Public-Facing Resources.,
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Root Causes: Political Gridlock Preventing Timely Reauthorization Of Critical Cybersecurity Programs., Conflation Of Cisa 2015 (Law) With Cisa (Agency) By Key Senators (E.G., Rand Paul)., Over-Reliance On Short-Term Continuing Resolutions For Long-Term Cybersecurity Needs., Lack Of Clear Legislative Vehicles For Updating Cisa 2015'S Threat Definitions (E.G., Ai, Supply Chain)., Insufficient Contingency Planning For Cisa Operations During Government Shutdowns.,
Corrective Actions: Bipartisan Negotiation To Separate Cisa 2015 Reauthorization From Unrelated Political Disputes., Development Of A Dedicated Legislative Process For Cybersecurity Updates (E.G., 5-Year Review Cycles)., Expansion Of Cisa'S Shutdown-Exempt Staff To Maintain Core Functions., Public-Private Working Groups To Modernize Threat-Sharing Frameworks (E.G., Ai, Systemic Risks)., State/Local Cybersecurity Coalitions To Sustain Grant-Funded Initiatives During Federal Lapses.,
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Root Causes: Government Shutdown Leading To Furloughs And Layoffs At Cisa., Political Disputes Redirecting Agency Focus Away From Core Cybersecurity Missions., Budget Cuts Targeting Critical Divisions (E.G., Isd, Sed)., High Attrition Rate (1,000+ Employees Left In 2023)., Perceived Mission Creep (E.G., Misinformation Efforts) Distracting From Cybersecurity Priorities.,
Corrective Actions: Restoration Of Cisa'S Workforce And Budget To Pre-Cut Levels., Depoliticization Of Agency Operations To Refocus On Cybersecurity., Reinstatement Of Eliminated Subdivisions (E.G., Chemical Security)., Stronger Legislative Protections For Cybersecurity Agencies During Government Shutdowns., Increased Transparency In Communicating Risks To Stakeholders.,
Incident : Espionage CIS1765238766
Root Causes: Advanced malware (BRICKSTORM) with obfuscation and persistence features
Incident : Cyberattack CIS1765368172
Root Causes: State-Sponsored Cyber Warfare, Geopolitical Conflict Exploitation,
What is the company's process for conducting post-incident analysis ?
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Recommended As Corrective Action, , Cyber Threat Alliance (Information-Sharing Coordination), Internet Security Alliance (Advocacy For Policy Updates), , Heightened alert about cybersecurity posture of mobile devices.
What corrective actions has the company taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Improve Detection And Response Capabilities, Enhance Local Law Enforcement Training, Deploy Advanced Technologies To Mitigate Drone Threats, , Enforce Mfa For All Remote Access., Disable Unnecessary Rdp Exposure To The Internet., Restrict Powershell To Administrative Use Only., Deploy Endpoint Detection And Response (Edr) Tools To Monitor For Malicious Activity., Conduct Regular Audits Of High-Privilege Accounts., , Revised Iam Policies With Least-Privilege Principles., Implemented Network Segmentation For Hsin Platforms., Enabled Centralized Logging And Monitoring (Dhs)., Mandated Encryption For Sensitive Data (Post-2025 Breach)., Conducted Staff Training On Secure Cloud Configurations., Deployed Automated Misconfiguration Detection Tools., Established Regular Audits For Public-Facing Resources., , Bipartisan Negotiation To Separate Cisa 2015 Reauthorization From Unrelated Political Disputes., Development Of A Dedicated Legislative Process For Cybersecurity Updates (E.G., 5-Year Review Cycles)., Expansion Of Cisa'S Shutdown-Exempt Staff To Maintain Core Functions., Public-Private Working Groups To Modernize Threat-Sharing Frameworks (E.G., Ai, Systemic Risks)., State/Local Cybersecurity Coalitions To Sustain Grant-Funded Initiatives During Federal Lapses., , Restoration Of Cisa'S Workforce And Budget To Pre-Cut Levels., Depoliticization Of Agency Operations To Refocus On Cybersecurity., Reinstatement Of Eliminated Subdivisions (E.G., Chemical Security)., Stronger Legislative Protections For Cybersecurity Agencies During Government Shutdowns., Increased Transparency In Communicating Risks To Stakeholders., .
Additional Questions
General Information
What was the amount of the last ransom demanded ?
Last Ransom Demanded: The amount of the last ransom demanded was True.
Who was the attacking group in the last incident ?
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Hacker, Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation's Project 2025, Political ClimateTrump Administration, Political Leadership Changes, Beijing, Unnamed Ransomware Gang, BianLian ransomware group, Nation-State ActorsCybercriminalsHacktivistsOpportunistic Hackers, Chinese hackers, Salt Typhoon and NoName057(16)CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR)GRU (Russian Military Intelligence).
Incident Details
What was the most recent incident detected ?
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2023-06-21.
What was the most recent incident publicly disclosed ?
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2023-10-01.
Impact of the Incidents
What was the most significant data compromised in an incident ?
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees, Information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence, , Employee names, Social Security numbers, Dates of birth, Positions, Grades, Duty locations, , call logs, recordings, potential location information, , , Sensitive Intelligence (DHS), 184M User Records (2025 Breach), Plain-Text Credentials (Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), Bank Accounts, Health Platforms, Government Portals, , Credentials and sensitive data.
What was the most significant system affected in an incident ?
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident were DHS OIG Case Management System and and HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach) and Critical Infrastructure (e.g., power grids, water treatment plants)Federal Cyber Defense SystemsThreat Intelligence Sharing Platforms and WindowsVMware vSphere and and Water systemsFood supply chainsPublic servicesMeat processing facilitiesGovernment websites.
Response to the Incidents
What third-party assistance was involved in the most recent incident ?
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was cyber threat alliance (information-sharing coordination), internet security alliance (advocacy for policy updates), .
What containment measures were taken in the most recent incident ?
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Improved detection and response capabilitiesLocal law enforcement trainingTechnology deployment and auditing RDP usagedisabling command-line scriptingrestricting PowerShell.
Data Breach Information
What was the most sensitive data compromised in a breach ?
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Duty locations, call logs, Sensitive Intelligence (DHS), recordings, Information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence, 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees, Bank Accounts, 184M User Records (2025 Breach), Grades, potential location information, Government Portals, Health Platforms, Credentials, sensitive data, Employee names, Plain-Text Credentials (Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), Positions, Social Security numbers and Dates of birth.
What was the number of records exposed in the most significant breach ?
Number of Records Exposed in Most Significant Breach: The number of records exposed in the most significant breach was 184.0M.
Ransomware Information
What was the highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident ?
Highest Ransom Demanded: The highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident was True.
Regulatory Compliance
What was the most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation ?
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Pending Extradition to the US, Indictment, Conspiracy charges, Fraud charges, Identity theft charges, .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What was the most significant lesson learned from past incidents ?
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Public-private partnerships require stable, well-funded government coordination to be effective.
What was the most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats, Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity., Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Review CISA's role as a sector risk management agency for the telecommunications industry; Justify the Mobile App Vetting Program's termination and detail CISA's updated plan for the telecommunications industry, Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Enhance local law enforcement training, Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity. and Improve detection and response capabilities.
References
What is the most recent source of information about an incident ?
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements, Motherboard, ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat, SecPod - Top 10 Cloud Misconfigurations, Google security researchers, ClearanceJobs, House Homeland Security Committee, SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO), AFP, Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023), Courthouse News, CISA, NSA, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel), CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program, Reward for Justice (US State Department), Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security Vulnerabilities, CyberScoop, Politico, FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics, Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher), US Department of Justice, CrowdStrike - Common Cloud Misconfigurations, Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton), CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware, WIRED and SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration Prevention.
What is the most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware, https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/, https://www.wiz.io/academy/top-cloud-vulnerabilities, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/ .
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the most recent investigation ?
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
What was the most recent stakeholder advisory issued ?
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was CISA, FBI, ACSC, FOIA Memo (DHS), Media Statements, Sen. Peters' warnings to reporters about national security risks., Cyber Threat Alliance and Internet Security Alliance statements on information-sharing impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican aide comments on CR extensions., House Democratic staffer remarks on state/local grant program success., Cybersecurity experts warn of increased risks due to CISA's reduced capacity., Private sector partners advised to bolster independent defenses amid government instability., .
What was the most recent customer advisory issued ?
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued was an None (DHS)Recommended Password Resets for 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach).
Initial Access Broker
What was the most recent entry point used by an initial access broker ?
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an Email Account and RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs).
Post-Incident Analysis
What was the most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats, Weak or stolen RDP credentialsLack of MFA on critical access pointsUnrestricted use of PowerShell for scriptingInsufficient monitoring for data exfiltration, Overly permissive IAM policies ('everyone' access).Lack of network segmentation (DHS).Disabled logging/missing alerts (no detection of unauthorized access).Human error in access configuration (HSIN-Intel).Plain-text storage of credentials (2025 Breach).Complex cloud architectures without adequate governance.Shadow IT/unmonitored accounts (potential factor).Inadequate policy-as-code enforcement., Political gridlock preventing timely reauthorization of critical cybersecurity programs.Conflation of CISA 2015 (law) with CISA (agency) by key senators (e.g., Rand Paul).Over-reliance on short-term Continuing Resolutions for long-term cybersecurity needs.Lack of clear legislative vehicles for updating CISA 2015's threat definitions (e.g., AI, supply chain).Insufficient contingency planning for CISA operations during government shutdowns., Government shutdown leading to furloughs and layoffs at CISA.Political disputes redirecting agency focus away from core cybersecurity missions.Budget cuts targeting critical divisions (e.g., ISD, SED).High attrition rate (1,000+ employees left in 2023).Perceived mission creep (e.g., misinformation efforts) distracting from cybersecurity priorities., Advanced malware (BRICKSTORM) with obfuscation and persistence features, State-sponsored cyber warfareGeopolitical conflict exploitation.
What was the most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Improve detection and response capabilitiesEnhance local law enforcement trainingDeploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats, Enforce MFA for all remote access.Disable unnecessary RDP exposure to the internet.Restrict PowerShell to administrative use only.Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to monitor for malicious activity.Conduct regular audits of high-privilege accounts., Revised IAM policies with least-privilege principles.Implemented network segmentation for HSIN platforms.Enabled centralized logging and monitoring (DHS).Mandated encryption for sensitive data (post-2025 Breach).Conducted staff training on secure cloud configurations.Deployed automated misconfiguration detection tools.Established regular audits for public-facing resources., Bipartisan negotiation to separate CISA 2015 reauthorization from unrelated political disputes.Development of a dedicated legislative process for cybersecurity updates (e.g., 5-year review cycles).Expansion of CISA's shutdown-exempt staff to maintain core functions.Public-private working groups to modernize threat-sharing frameworks (e.g., AI, systemic risks).State/local cybersecurity coalitions to sustain grant-funded initiatives during federal lapses., Restoration of CISA's workforce and budget to pre-cut levels.Depoliticization of agency operations to refocus on cybersecurity.Reinstatement of eliminated subdivisions (e.g., Chemical Security).Stronger legislative protections for cybersecurity agencies during government shutdowns.Increased transparency in communicating risks to stakeholders..
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Latest Global CVEs (Not Company-Specific)
Description
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Versions starting with 0.211.0 and prior to 1.120.4, 1.121.1, and 1.122.0 contain a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in their workflow expression evaluation system. Under certain conditions, expressions supplied by authenticated users during workflow configuration may be evaluated in an execution context that is not sufficiently isolated from the underlying runtime. An authenticated attacker could abuse this behavior to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the n8n process. Successful exploitation may lead to full compromise of the affected instance, including unauthorized access to sensitive data, modification of workflows, and execution of system-level operations. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.120.4, 1.121.1, and 1.122.0. Users are strongly advised to upgrade to a patched version, which introduces additional safeguards to restrict expression evaluation. If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only; and/or deploy n8n in a hardened environment with restricted operating system privileges and network access to reduce the impact of potential exploitation. These workarounds do not fully eliminate the risk and should only be used as short-term measures.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 9.9
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/08f332015153decdda3c37ad4fcb9f7ba13a7c79
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/1c933358acef527ff61466e53268b41a04be1000
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/39a2d1d60edde89674ca96dcbb3eb076ffff6316
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-v98v-ff95-f3cp
Description
FastAPI Users allows users to quickly add a registration and authentication system to their FastAPI project. Prior to version 15.0.2, the OAuth login state tokens are completely stateless and carry no per-request entropy or any data that could link them to the session that initiated the OAuth flow. `generate_state_token()` is always called with an empty `state_data` dict, so the resulting JWT only contains the fixed audience claim plus an expiration timestamp. On callback, the library merely checks that the JWT verifies under `state_secret` and is unexpired; there is no attempt to match the state value to the browser that initiated the OAuth request, no correlation cookie, and no server-side cache. Any attacker can hit `/authorize`, capture the server-generated state, finish the upstream OAuth flow with their own provider account, and then trick a victim into loading `.../callback?code=<attacker_code>&state=<attacker_state>`. Because the state JWT is valid for any client for \~1 hour, the victim’s browser will complete the flow. This leads to login CSRF. Depending on the app’s logic, the login CSRF can lead to an account takeover of the victim account or to the victim user getting logged in to the attacker's account. Version 15.0.2 contains a patch for the issue.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 5.9
Severity: HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
References
- https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/blob/bcee8c9b884de31decb5d799aead3974a0b5b158/fastapi_users/router/oauth.py#L111
- https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/blob/bcee8c9b884de31decb5d799aead3974a0b5b158/fastapi_users/router/oauth.py#L57
- https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/commit/7cf413cd766b9cb0ab323ce424ddab2c0d235932
- https://github.com/fastapi-users/fastapi-users/security/advisories/GHSA-5j53-63w8-8625
Description
FileZilla Client 3.63.1 contains a DLL hijacking vulnerability that allows attackers to execute malicious code by placing a crafted TextShaping.dll in the application directory. Attackers can generate a reverse shell payload using msfvenom and replace the missing DLL to achieve remote code execution when the application launches.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 9.8
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
cvss4
Base: 8.5
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
LDAP Tool Box Self Service Password 1.5.2 contains a password reset vulnerability that allows attackers to manipulate HTTP Host headers during token generation. Attackers can craft malicious password reset requests that generate tokens sent to a controlled server, enabling potential account takeover by intercepting and using stolen reset tokens.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
cvss4
Base: 8.6
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
Kimai 1.30.10 contains a SameSite cookie vulnerability that allows attackers to steal user session cookies through malicious exploitation. Attackers can trick victims into executing a crafted PHP script that captures and writes session cookie information to a file, enabling potential session hijacking.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 9.8
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
cvss4
Base: 8.5
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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RapidWhat Do We Measure ?
Incident
Finding
Grade
Digital Assets
Every week, Rankiteo analyzes billions of signals to give organizations a sharper, faster view of emerging risks. With deeper, more actionable intelligence at their fingertips, security teams can outpace threat actors, respond instantly to Zero-Day attacks, and dramatically shrink their risk exposure window.
These are some of the factors we use to calculate the overall score:
Network Security
Identify exposed access points, detect misconfigured SSL certificates, and uncover vulnerabilities across the network infrastructure.
SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)
Gain visibility into the software components used within an organization to detect vulnerabilities, manage risk, and ensure supply chain security.
CMDB (Configuration Management Database)
Monitor and manage all IT assets and their configurations to ensure accurate, real-time visibility across the company's technology environment.
Threat Intelligence
Leverage real-time insights on active threats, malware campaigns, and emerging vulnerabilities to proactively defend against evolving cyberattacks.
Rankiteo is a unified scoring and risk platform that analyzes billions of signals weekly to help organizations gain faster, more actionable insights into emerging threats. Empowering teams to outpace adversaries and reduce exposure.
