The team provides industry-leading third-party underwriting and pool management on DeFi Protocols, risk structuring, and institutional risk advisory services.
A formidable global conglomerate, LOLC Holdings has strategically diversified into key economic growth sectors across financial services, leisure, agriculture and plantations, construction and real estate, manufacturing and trading, technology, research and innovation and strategic investments. The LOLC Group is on an accelerated growth trajectory and is inspired by the quest to nurture and shape the future of individuals and communities across the world. As a leading player in the International MSME sector, the LOLC Group has been a catalyst in facilitating, whilst striving to maximise environmental benefits through green financing, promoting financial independence for women and uplifting customers from poverty through financial inclusion in global markets. In keeping with its alignment to UN Sustainable Development Goals, LOLC is a catalyst of economic development as a responsible lender while maintaining strong client protection principles. Transforming communities in the South and South East Asian markets, the LOLC Group has made giant strides to entrench its footprint across Africa and Central Asia. The Group has already built its reputation as one of the largest multi-currency, multi-geography inclusive finance platform in the world, backed by advanced tech platforms designed by its fully-owned subsidiary companies which have now been successfully adopted across borders.
Security & Compliance Standards Overview
No incidents recorded for Cicada Partners in 2025.
No incidents recorded for LOLC Holdings PLC in 2025.
Cicada Partners cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
LOLC Holdings PLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company
In GnuPG through 2.4.8, if a signed message has \f at the end of a plaintext line, an adversary can construct a modified message that places additional text after the signed material, such that signature verification of the modified message succeeds (although an "invalid armor" message is printed during verification). This is related to use of \f as a marker to denote truncation of a long plaintext line.
A vulnerability has been found in jackq XCMS up to 3fab5342cc509945a7ce1b8ec39d19f701b89261. Affected is the function Upload of the file Admin/Home/Controller/ProductImageController.class.php of the component Backend. Such manipulation of the argument File leads to unrestricted upload. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product takes the approach of rolling releases to provide continious delivery. Therefore, version details for affected and updated releases are not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
In PHP versions 8.1.* before 8.1.34, 8.2.* before 8.2.30, 8.3.* before 8.3.29, 8.4.* before 8.4.16, 8.5.* before 8.5.1 when using the PDO PostgreSQL driver with PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES enabled, an invalid character sequence (such as \x99) in a prepared statement parameter may cause the quoting function PQescapeStringConn to return NULL, leading to a null pointer dereference in pdo_parse_params() function. This may lead to crashes (segmentation fault) and affect the availability of the target server.
In PHP versions:8.1.* before 8.1.34, 8.2.* before 8.2.30, 8.3.* before 8.3.29, 8.4.* before 8.4.16, 8.5.* before 8.5.1, a heap buffer overflow occurs in array_merge() when the total element count of packed arrays exceeds 32-bit limits or HT_MAX_SIZE, due to an integer overflow in the precomputation of element counts using zend_hash_num_elements(). This may lead to memory corruption or crashes and affect the integrity and availability of the target server.
In PHP versions:8.1.* before 8.1.34, 8.2.* before 8.2.30, 8.3.* before 8.3.29, 8.4.* before 8.4.16, 8.5.* before 8.5.1, the getimagesize() function may leak uninitialized heap memory into the APPn segments (e.g., APP1) when reading images in multi-chunk mode (such as via php://filter). This occurs due to a bug in php_read_stream_all_chunks() that overwrites the buffer without advancing the pointer, leaving tail bytes uninitialized. This may lead to information disclosure of sensitive heap data and affect the confidentiality of the target server.
