Comparison Overview
中建西部建设

中建西部建设
四川省成都市高新区交子大道177号中海国际中心B座22楼, CHENGDU, SC | Sichuan, undefined, CN
Last Update: 15/12/2025
主要经营业务板块:中建西部建设是国内领先的建材产业综合服务商,专注于混凝土及相关业务,并拥有从矿山、水泥、预拌混凝土、砂浆到运输、泵送、检测较为完整的产业链。 新业务拓展方向:建筑工业化、固废利用、基础设施、海外业务等。 主要经营区域(主要工作地点):公司主营业务覆盖西北、西南、东北、华北、华中、华南、东南等主要区域的二十余个省市,并跟随中国建筑,进入阿尔及利亚、马来西亚、印度尼西亚市场。主要工作地点为:新疆、甘肃、山东、河南、青海、湖北、安徽、江西、福建、四川、重庆、云南、广西、陕西、天津、山西、辽宁、湖南、海南、贵州、广东及部分海...

Bouygues Construction
Challenger, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, 78 280, FR
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Bouygues Construction employs 35,600 people around the world, all driven by the greatest and most exciting responsibility of all – building for life. For our customers in more than 50 countries, we deliver much more than projects. We build to create spaces, connectio...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

中建西部建设







Bouygues Construction






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for 中建西部建设 in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bouygues Construction in 2026.
Incident History - 中建西部建设 (X = Date, Y = Severity)
中建西部建设 cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Bouygues Construction (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bouygues Construction cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

中建西部建设

Bouygues Construction
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Cline is an autonomous coding agent as an SDK, IDE extension, or CLI assistant. Prior to 3.0.30, the Cline Hub dashboard server launched by the cline dashboard command accepts WebSocket connections on the /browser endpoint without validating the Origin header, and when ROOM_SECRET is unset for local 127.0.0.1 binds, isAuthorizedBrowserRequest() allows attacker-controlled websites to send desktopCommand frames that read workspace state, mutate MCP and provider settings, and trigger command execution when a provider or model is configured. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.30.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. In version 1.9.0, CoreWCF SPNEGO SecurityContextToken negotiation can expose the proof key recovered from the RSTR when TransportWithMessageCredential with Windows client credentials and session establishment are used, allowing an observer to impersonate the authenticated Windows principal and decrypt or forge WS-SecureConversation traffic. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.1.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF WS-Security endorsing and supporting signature verification does not ensure the selected ds:Signature covers the expected Security header target, allowing an attacker with one captured signed SOAP envelope to replay arbitrary service operations as the victim principal. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0589692d4b9a41d21b34ac48281e95f6df7f4ce5
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/30aef805270976c42477e3f2a05f4e563d86e247
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/4618f24165ad018ad3ed2636bf8c3bc87d2a3be2
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-gqv6-pwcg-87r8
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0 token validation does not correctly resolve the issuer signing key or require signed tokens when IdentityConfiguration is used with federated bindings, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to impersonate any principal the trusted STS could issue. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0b8c8af851260e85e8402af53233d1b8f87dfb6f
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0e63c2cca55763d8be6b226a234579280a09e7b6
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/e5cc9b6a4ecc102a50d782093bfc72e0790abe3d
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-xjr9-gg9q-jx3v
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML token validation does not enforce SubjectConfirmation method URIs or holder-of-key proof keys in SamlSecurityTokenHandler, allowing holder-of-key downgrade or custom confirmation method assertions to authenticate a subject without proving authority over the assertion. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/6a99df3242f54acd6f89edfd6050430b72d0c685
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/86dd3232b6b8aaf32281be9e8d798afad6145d58
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/9eb9b46d1c2af06fb71f656a02f4d5b4649c1f03
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4