Comparison Overview
Children's Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA)

Children's Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA)
4650 Sunset Blvd, Los Angeles, CA, US, 90027
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Here at CHLA, we believe every child deserves to enjoy all those special moments that childhood has to offer, free from pain and suffering. This is what inspires our staff to be their best—and they’re equipped with everything they need to succeed. If you want to help cr...

Greater Paris University Hospitals - AP-HP
55, Boulevard Diderot, Paris, 75012, FR
Last Update: 11/09/2026
AP-HP (Greater Paris University Hospitals) is a European world-renowned university hospital. Its 39 hospitals treat 8 million people every year: in consultation, emergency, during scheduled or home hospitalizations. The AP-HP provides a public health service for everyo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Children's Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA)







Greater Paris University Hospitals - AP-HP






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Children's Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA) in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Greater Paris University Hospitals - AP-HP in 2026.
Incident History - Children's Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Children's Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Greater Paris University Hospitals - AP-HP (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Greater Paris University Hospitals - AP-HP cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Children's Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA)

Greater Paris University Hospitals - AP-HP
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.