Comparison Overview
Centro de Tecnologia da Informação de São Carlos

Centro de Tecnologia da Informação de São Carlos
Avenida Trabalhador São Carlense 400, São Carlos, São Paulo, 13566-590, BR
Last Update: 19/02/2026
O Centro de Tecnologia da Informação de São Carlos (CeTI-SC) é o órgão executor da Superintendência de Tecnologia da Informação nos Campi de São Carlos e de Pirassununga e no Serviço Especial de Saúde de Araraquara (SESA/FSP) na implantação e execução das competências d...

Computacenter
Hatfield Avenue, Hatfield, AL10 9TW, GB
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Computacenter is a leading independent technology and services provider, trusted by large corporate and public sector organisations. We are a responsible business that believes in winning together for our people and our planet. We help our customers to Source, Tran...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Centro de Tecnologia da Informação de São Carlos







Computacenter






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Information Technology & Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Centro de Tecnologia da Informação de São Carlos in 2026.
Incidents vs Information Technology & Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Computacenter in 2026.
Incident History - Centro de Tecnologia da Informação de São Carlos (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Centro de Tecnologia da Informação de São Carlos cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Computacenter (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Computacenter cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Centro de Tecnologia da Informação de São Carlos

Computacenter
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.