Comparison Overview
Central Retail in Vietnam

Central Retail in Vietnam
163 Đường Phan Đăng Lưu, Phường Cầu Kiệu, Ho Chi Minh City, VN
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Central Retail in Vietnam was established in 2012 with only Fashion business. After more than 12 years, we have become the largest multi-format foreign retailer in Vietnam with 330+ stores, 43 malls across the country with more than 1,300,000 total square meter of retai...

Pilot Flying J
5508 Lonas Rd., Knoxville, 37909, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Company Overview Headquartered in Knoxville, Tennessee, Pilot Flying J is the largest operator of travel centers in North America with more than 750 locations throughout the United States and Canada and employs more than 24,000 Team Members. Pilot Flying J services over...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Central Retail in Vietnam







Pilot Flying J






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Central Retail in Vietnam in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Pilot Flying J in 2026.
Incident History - Central Retail in Vietnam (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Central Retail in Vietnam cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Pilot Flying J (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Pilot Flying J cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Central Retail in Vietnam

Pilot Flying J
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.