Comparison Overview
CEAT Limited

CEAT Limited
Dr Annie Besant Road, Mumbai, Maharashtra, 400030, IN
Last Update: 20/01/2026
CEAT, the flagship company of RPG Enterprises, was established in 1958. Today, CEAT is one of India’s leading tyre manufacturers and has a strong presence in global markets. CEAT achieved the distinction of being the first tyre brand worldwide to be awarded the "Lightho...

Dana Incorporated
3939 Technology Drive, Maumee, 43537, US
Last Update: 12/09/2026
In a world of constant motion, life is about balance. At Dana, our balanced approach considers the people, products, and planet that sustain us all. For 120 years, we've been powering innovation to move our world. Today, over 25,000 Dana people, in more than 20 countr...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

CEAT Limited







Dana Incorporated






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for CEAT Limited in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Dana Incorporated in 2026.
Incident History - CEAT Limited (X = Date, Y = Severity)
CEAT Limited cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Dana Incorporated (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Dana Incorporated cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

CEAT Limited

Dana Incorporated
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.