Comparison Overview
Castlight Health

Castlight Health
1201 2nd Ave, Seattle, 98101, US
Last Update: 30/03/2026
Castlight makes it easy for members to understand, use, and maximize their healthcare benefits by connecting them with the right care at the right time for their personal health journey. Castlight also helps employers effectively select, manage, and deploy benefits thro...

Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica
Av. Paulista 867, São Paulo, 01311-100, BR
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Com 80 anos de experiência, a Hapvida é hoje a maior empresa de saúde integrada da América Latina. A companhia, que possui mais de 73 mil colaboradores, atende 16 milhões de beneficiários de saúde e odontologia espalhados pelas cinco regiões do Brasil. Todo o aparato ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Castlight Health







Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Castlight Health in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica in 2026.
Incident History - Castlight Health (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Castlight Health cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Castlight Health

Hapvida NotreDame Intermédica
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.