Comparison Overview
Cascade Coffee, LLC

Cascade Coffee, LLC
1525 75th St SW, Everett, WA, US, 98203
Last Update: 19/09/2026
Cascade Coffee is one of the largest contract roasting and packaging operations in the United States. Located in Everett, Washington, Cascade has capabilities of producing nearly 50 million pounds of coffee annually. Including 6 state of the art Probat batch roasters,...

UNFI
313 Iron Horse Way, Providence, RI, US, 02908
Last Update: 02/04/2026
UNFI is North America’s Premier Food Wholesaler. We transform the world of food for our associates, customers, suppliers and the families we serve every day. With deeper full store selection and compelling brands for every aisle, built on an unmatched heritage in gre...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Cascade Coffee, LLC







UNFI






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
Cascade Coffee, LLC has 46.52% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for UNFI in 2026.
Incident History - Cascade Coffee, LLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Cascade Coffee, LLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - UNFI (X = Date, Y = Severity)
UNFI cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Cascade Coffee, LLC

UNFI
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.