Comparison Overview
Cartera – A Rakuten Company

Cartera – A Rakuten Company
One Cranberry Hill, Suite 203, Lexington, MA, 02421, US
Last Update: 20/04/2026
Cartera: A Rakuten Company We make shopping more rewarding. Cartera partners with major airlines and top banks who offer their customers loyalty programs. Since our launch in 2005, we’ve improved their customers’ experiences by helping them earn more of the miles, poin...

YouTube
901 Cherry Ave., San Bruno, 94066, US
Last Update: 23/06/2026
YouTube is a team-oriented, creative workplace where every single employee has a voice in the choices we make and the features we implement. We work together in small teams to design, develop, and roll out key features and products in very short time frames. Which means...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Cartera – A Rakuten Company







YouTube






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Cartera – A Rakuten Company in 2026.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
YouTube has 94.17% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Cartera – A Rakuten Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Cartera – A Rakuten Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - YouTube (X = Date, Y = Severity)
YouTube cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Cartera – A Rakuten Company

YouTube
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.