Comparison Overview
Capital Group

Capital Group
333 South Hope Street, Los Angeles, CA, US, 90071
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Capital Group was established in 1931 in Los Angeles, California, and now has 31 offices around the globe. For over 90 years we've provided carefully researched investment solutions and services to financial professionals. *** We've been made aware of an employment sca...

Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Limited
Chola Crest, C54-55 & Super B-4, Thiru-Vi-Ka Industrial Estate, Guindy,, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, IN, 600032
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Limited (Chola), founded in 1978 as part of the Murugappa Group, initially focused on equipment financing. Over the years, Chola has transformed into a leading comprehensive financial services provider, offering a wide array ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Capital Group







Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Limited






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Capital Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Limited in 2026.
Incident History - Capital Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Capital Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Limited (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Limited cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Capital Group

Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Limited
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.