Comparison Overview
Cadence Aerospace

Cadence Aerospace
3150 E Miraloma Ave, Anaheim, 92806, US
Last Update: 24/03/2026
Cadence Aerospace is an aerospace and defense industry supplier committed to achieving success with our business partners, through active engagement, aligned manufacturing and sourcing strategies and industry-leading capabilities. We produce machined parts, subasse...

Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, 20591, US
Last Update: 10/09/2026
The FAA is on the leading edge of a new frontier in commercial space transportation, building the next generation (NextGen) of satellite-based navigation systems, and fostering the safe integration of unmanned aerial systems into our airspace. We can only dream of what ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Cadence Aerospace







Federal Aviation Administration






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Cadence Aerospace in 2026.
Incidents vs Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Federal Aviation Administration in 2026.
Incident History - Cadence Aerospace (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Cadence Aerospace cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Federal Aviation Administration (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Federal Aviation Administration cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Cadence Aerospace

Federal Aviation Administration
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.