Comparison Overview
Building Technology Engineers, Inc

Building Technology Engineers, Inc
105 Central Street, Stoneham, MA, 02180, US
Last Update: 05/12/2025
Known as an industry leader, Building Technology Engineers, Inc. (BTE) provides on-site operations and maintenance, and technical facilities services for commercial, industrial, and institutional clients across New England. BTE forges a partnership with each client ...

Grupo GPS
Avenida Miguel Frias e Vasconcelos, 1205 - Jaguaré, São Paulo, 05345000, BR
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Fundado em 1962, em Salvador, o Grupo GPS é um grupo empresarial composto por empresas atuantes no mercado brasileiro de serviços indoor: GPS – Gerenciamento de segurança patrimonial Predial – Soluções em infra serviços In-Haus – Logística flexível traduzida em resulta...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Building Technology Engineers, Inc







Grupo GPS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Facilities Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Building Technology Engineers, Inc in 2026.
Incidents vs Facilities Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grupo GPS in 2026.
Incident History - Building Technology Engineers, Inc (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Building Technology Engineers, Inc cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Grupo GPS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grupo GPS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Building Technology Engineers, Inc

Grupo GPS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.