Comparison Overview
Bühler Group Rice Processing

Bühler Group Rice Processing
13 d KIADB Industrial Area Road, Bengaluru South, 560074, IN
Last Update: 07/03/2026
Rice is among the most important crops of the world. With our solutions we have created the basis to build future success for the world's nutrition. Over 30% of newly and global installed rice plants use Bühler equipment. Our technology covers the full range of rice and...

Atlas Copco Group
Sickla Industriväg 19, Stockholm, 10523, SE
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Atlas Copco Group enables technology that transforms the future. We innovate to develop products, services and solutions that are key to our customers’ success. Our four business areas offer compressed air and vacuum solutions, energy solutions, dewatering and industria...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Bühler Group Rice Processing







Atlas Copco Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bühler Group Rice Processing in 2026.
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Atlas Copco Group in 2026.
Incident History - Bühler Group Rice Processing (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bühler Group Rice Processing cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Atlas Copco Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Atlas Copco Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Bühler Group Rice Processing

Atlas Copco Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
FlatPress versions prior to commit 10be83c, contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in comment and contact forms where name, URL, and email fields are rendered without proper output encoding in Smarty templates. Attackers can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript through these fields to execute malicious scripts in browsers of viewers including administrators, or bypass URL scheme validation to inject javascript: or data: URIs.
Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. Versions prior to 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 use the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required. Versions 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 patch the issue.
Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. In versions prior to 8.6.0, a user with only users.edit can send a PATCH to /api/v1/users/{their_own_id} and grant themselves any permission except admin and superuser — for example `assets.view`, `assets.create`, `reports.view`, import, etc. The issue is patched in version 8.6.0.
Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. Versions prior to 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 are vulnerable to CSV Injection (Formula Injection) in its log export functionality. User-controlled data — specifically the username field — is written to exported CSV files without sanitizing formula trigger characters (=, +, -, @). When an administrator exports activity logs and opens the resulting CSV in a spreadsheet application (Microsoft Excel, LibreOffice Calc, Google Sheets), any formula stored in a username is executed by the application. This can be used for phishing attacks against administrators or data exfiltration. Versions 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 patch the issue.
Fortra File Integrity Monitoring (FIM), formerly Tripwire Enterprise, versions prior to 9.4.0 may assign incorrect or elevated effective permissions to users created by the tetool import command while FIM is running, particularly when the import also creates or changes roles or role-permission relationships.