Comparison Overview
Bubba Gump Shrimp Co.

Bubba Gump Shrimp Co.
1510 West Loop South, Houston, Texas, 77027, US
Last Update: 19/04/2026
The first Bubba Gump Shrimp Co. Restaurant and Market opened in 1996 on Cannery Row in Monterrey, California. We’ve since grown to include many notable locations throughout the United States and internationally. At the core, we are a small chain of seafood restauran...

TUI
Karl-Wiechert Allee 23, Hannover, 30625, DE
Last Update: 08/09/2026
We’re adventure seekers. Smile givers. Impact makers. We believe in the power of travel. It broadens horizons for our customers, and for our people too. New places to live, new roles to explore, new communities to join. It’s yours for the taking. We’re TUI, a leading...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Bubba Gump Shrimp Co.







TUI






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitality Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bubba Gump Shrimp Co. in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitality Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TUI in 2026.
Incident History - Bubba Gump Shrimp Co. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bubba Gump Shrimp Co. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TUI (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TUI cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Bubba Gump Shrimp Co.

TUI
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.