Comparison Overview
BSH Hausgeräte AG

BSH Hausgeräte AG
Fahrweidstrasse 80, Geroldswil, 8954, CH
Last Update: 23/12/2025
Neben den weltweit bekannten Marken Bosch und Siemens vertreiben wir als BSH in der Schweiz auch High-End Produkte der Luxusmarke Gaggenau. Wir positionieren uns als eines der führenden Unternehmen in der Schweizer Hausgeräte Branche und sind an zwei Standorten vertrete...

General Mills
One General Mills Boulevard, Minneapolis, Minnesota, US, 55426
Last Update: 02/04/2026
We exist to make food the world loves. But we do more than that. General Mills is a place that prioritizes being a force for good, a place to expand learning, explore new perspectives and reimagine new possibilities, every day. We look for people who want to bring their...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

BSH Hausgeräte AG







General Mills






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BSH Hausgeräte AG in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for General Mills in 2026.
Incident History - BSH Hausgeräte AG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BSH Hausgeräte AG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - General Mills (X = Date, Y = Severity)
General Mills cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

BSH Hausgeräte AG

General Mills
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.