Comparison Overview
Brinks Home

Brinks Home
1501 Lyndon B Johnson Fwy, Dallas, 75234, US
Last Update: 30/07/2026
Brinks Home, headquartered in Dallas, Texas, stands for platinum-grade protection. As one of the largest smart home security providers in the U.S., we protect more than 1 million people in the U.S., Canada, and Puerto Rico. The company’s highly responsive, smart home se...

Sharp
匠町1 堺市堺区, 大阪府 590-8522, JP
Last Update: 23/03/2026
„ÄêCorporate Name„Äë Sharp Corporation „ÄêHead Office„Äë 1 Takumi-cho, Sakai-ku, Sakai City, Osaka 590-8522, Japan „ÄêManagement Representatives„Äë Masahiro Okitsu, President & Chief Executive Officer „ÄêBusiness Activities„Äë Mainly manufacturing and sales of teleco...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Brinks Home







Sharp






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Consumer Electronics Industry Avg (This Year)
Brinks Home has 68.75% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Consumer Electronics Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sharp in 2026.
Incident History - Brinks Home (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Brinks Home cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Sharp (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sharp cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Brinks Home

Sharp
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Designate before 22.0.2, the mDNS handler performs pool-blind lookups when resolving record queries and NOTIFY requests. When two zones with the same name exist across different pools, the lookup fails with a deterministic error, causing the handler to return REFUSED for all DNS queries through that path. The _handle_notify path is exploitable via a single unauthenticated UDP packet. This is independently reachable through the cross-tenant zone overlap described in a different recent CVE, and also affects legitimate same-tenant cross-pool configurations. BIND9 views do not mitigate this issue as mDNS is a shared service upstream of any view configuration.
In OpenStack Designate before 22.0.1, zone creation checks (_is_subzone, _is_superzone, and the duplicate-zone DB constraint) are scoped to the target pool only. An authenticated user can bypass these checks by scheduling a zone to a different pool via the AttributeFilter scheduler, creating an overlapping zone that conflicts with another tenant's zone. This enables cross-tenant DNS hijack (redirecting traffic to attacker-controlled IPs) and DNS denial of service (NODATA responses). Exploitation requires a multi-pool deployment with AttributeFilter enabled in scheduler_filters, which is a non-default but documented and supported configuration for self-service tiering.
UpSnap is a wake on lan web app. Versions prior to 5.4.0 have an OS command injection vulnerability in the UpSnap’s device management functionality due to the presence of unsafe shell command template interpolation using the ip and the mac fields. User-controlled values can be inserted into the wake_cmd and shutdown_cmd templates and executed via /bin/sh -c (Linux) or cmd /C (Windows) without sanitization, resulting in an authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE). A low-privileged user with permission to create or edit devices can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the UpSnap hosted server. Version 5.4.0 patches the issue.
FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. When `secureEnabled=true`, FUXA `1.3.0-2773` still allows guest and invalid-token requests to read project, alarms, and scheduler APIs. Version 1.3.1 fixes this issue.
FUXA is a web-based Process Visualization (SCADA/HMI/Dashboard) software. In fuxa-server version 1.3.0, the GET /api/project endpoint exposes sensitive project configuration data to guest-context requests even when secureEnabled is enabled. Version 1.3.1 fixes the issue.