Comparison Overview
BRAC-Aarong

BRAC-Aarong
346 Tejgaon Industrial Area, Dhaka, undefined, 1208, BD
Last Update: 07/03/2026
Aarong is Bangladesh’s most popular lifestyle retail chain. This ethical brand began in 1978 as a humble means to empower rural artisans to rise above poverty. Today, with 28 retail stores across Bangladesh and over 100 fashion and lifestyle product lines, Aarong suppor...

DMart - Avenue Supermarts Ltd
Thane, Mumbai, 400601, IN
Last Update: 01/04/2026
“DMart is a one-stop supermarket chain that aims to offer customers a wide range of basic home and personal products under one roof. Each DMart store stocks home utility products - including food, toiletries, beauty products, garments, kitchenware, bed and bath linen, h...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

BRAC-Aarong







DMart - Avenue Supermarts Ltd






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BRAC-Aarong in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DMart - Avenue Supermarts Ltd in 2026.
Incident History - BRAC-Aarong (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BRAC-Aarong cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - DMart - Avenue Supermarts Ltd (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DMart - Avenue Supermarts Ltd cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

BRAC-Aarong

DMart - Avenue Supermarts Ltd
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.