Comparison Overview
Bol International Partners

Bol International Partners
Papendorpseweg, Utrecht, 3528 BJ, NL
Last Update: 21/04/2026
Bol is the best-known marketplace in the Netherlands and Belgium. We have 13.7* active customers and 47.000* partners on our platform. We’re also a member of the global Ahold-Delhaize family. Our assortment encompasses roughly 41 million* items across various domains (r...

B&Q
undefined, Southampton, undefined, undefined, GB
Last Update: 02/04/2026
We are the UK’s leading home improvement and garden living retailer with over 300 stores throughout the UK and Ireland, offering great prices, with over 100,000 products available to order at diy.com for home delivery or click and collect. We launched the UK’s first ho...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Bol International Partners







B&Q






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bol International Partners in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for B&Q in 2026.
Incident History - Bol International Partners (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bol International Partners cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - B&Q (X = Date, Y = Severity)
B&Q cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Bol International Partners

B&Q
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.