Comparison Overview
Bois & Habitat

Bois & Habitat
Avenue Sergent Vrithoff 2, Namur, 5000, BE
Last Update: 02/12/2025
Bois & Habitat fête sa 25e édition du 28 au 31 mars 2025 à Namur Expo. 🏡 L’unique salon belge dédié au bois et aux éco-matériaux : les choix n°1 pour construire, rénover, aménager RESPONSABLE et relever le défi de la neutralité carbone à l’horizon 2050 ! 🌳 🌍

Tata Projects
14th - 15th Floor, Cignus, Mumbai, 400087, IN
Last Update: 04/09/2026
Tata Projects is one of the most admired Technology led Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) companies in India. We have expertise in providing sustainable solutions in the execution of large and complex urban and industrial infrastructure projects while also...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Bois & Habitat







Tata Projects






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bois & Habitat in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tata Projects in 2026.
Incident History - Bois & Habitat (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bois & Habitat cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Tata Projects (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tata Projects cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Bois & Habitat

Tata Projects
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.