Comparison Overview
BlueVoyant Government Solutions

BlueVoyant Government Solutions
919 18th Street NW, Washington, 20006, US
Last Update: 28/03/2026
An independent BlueVoyant subsidiary, BlueVoyant Government Solutions provides an end-to-end supply chain risk management solution for government organizations charged with defending the health and security of mission-critical programs and industrial bases. BlueVoyant’s...

JD.COM
JD Building, No. 18 Kechuang 11 Street, BDA, Beijing, 101111, CN
Last Update: 22/06/2026
JD.com, also known as JINGDONG, is a leading e-commerce company transferring to be a technology and service enterprise with supply chain at its core. JD.com’s business has expanded across retail, technology, logistics, health, property development, industrials, and inte...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

BlueVoyant Government Solutions







JD.COM






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BlueVoyant Government Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for JD.COM in 2026.
Incident History - BlueVoyant Government Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BlueVoyant Government Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - JD.COM (X = Date, Y = Severity)
JD.COM cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

BlueVoyant Government Solutions

JD.COM
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security flaw has been discovered in SourceCodester Onlne Examination & Learning Management System 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function pathinfo of the file /upload_files.php of the component Filename Extension. Performing a manipulation results in unrestricted upload. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The name of the affected product appears to have a typo in it.
A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Onlne Examination & Learning Management System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /process_lesson.php. Such manipulation of the argument user_id leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The name of the affected product appears to have a typo in it.
A vulnerability was determined in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file /paymentdischarge.php. This manipulation of the argument patientid causes sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.
A vulnerability was found in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown function of the file /payment.php. The manipulation of the argument patientid results in sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
Zephyr's DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, '.'), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname's final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string's NUL terminator. The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces). On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure. The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local").