Comparison Overview
Binari Sonori

Binari Sonori
Viale Fulvio Testi, 11, Cinisello Balsamo, 20092, IT
Last Update: 01/03/2026
Binari Sonori was founded in 1994, at the dawn of the new media age, to offer translation and audio services to developers and publishers looking to distribute digital content on an international level. The company swiftly became an important player on the global locali...

Propio Language Services
4950 College Blvd, Overland Park, Kansas, US, 66211
Last Update: 25/08/2026
Language Access, Driven by Innovation. We believe our technology-forward commitment allows us to offer a full suite of over-the-phone, video remote, in-person interpreting, translation and localization services. Our services provide Limited English Proficient speakers...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Binari Sonori







Propio Language Services






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Translation and Localization Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Binari Sonori in 2026.
Incidents vs Translation and Localization Industry Avg (This Year)
Propio Language Services has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Binari Sonori (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Binari Sonori cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Propio Language Services (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Propio Language Services cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Binari Sonori

Propio Language Services
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.