Comparison Overview
BGP International

BGP International
BGP Pakistan, 涿州, 河北省, CN
Last Update: 15/03/2026
BGP is one of the world's competitive geophysical companies, delivering a wide range of geophysical products and services. In 2002, BGP became a liability-limited company after merging with six other Chinese geophysical divisions, with its headquarters located in Zhuozh...

Equinor
Forusbeen 50, Stavanger, Rogaland, NO, 4035
Last Update: 10/09/2026
We're Equinor, an international energy company with a proud history. Formerly Statoil, we are 20,000 committed colleagues developing oil, gas, wind and solar energy in more than 30 countries worldwide. We’re the largest operator in Norway, among the world’s largest offs...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

BGP International







Equinor






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BGP International in 2026.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Equinor in 2026.
Incident History - BGP International (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BGP International cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Equinor (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Equinor cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

BGP International

Equinor
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Nginx Proxy Manager through 2.16.0 fails to restrict the advanced_config field to administrators, allowing non-admin users with manage permissions to inject arbitrary nginx directives. Attackers can inject malicious nginx configuration such as alias directives to serve arbitrary files or control routing for their assigned hosts.
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/blob/v2.16.0/README.md#L36
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/blob/v2.16.0/backend/internal/user.js#L52-L62
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/blob/v2.16.0/backend/templates/proxy_host.conf#L28
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/issues/5749
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/pull/5908
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nginx-proxy-manager-through-2.16.0-improper-authorization-via-advanced-config
Nginx Proxy Manager through 2.16.0 lacks rate-limiting on authentication endpoints, allowing unauthenticated attackers to make unlimited password guesses against any account. Attackers can brute-force login credentials via POST /api/tokens and subsequently guess TOTP codes via POST /api/tokens/2fa to gain full session access and administrative control.
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/blob/v2.16.0/backend/app.js#L15-L58
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/blob/v2.16.0/backend/internal/2fa.js#L196-L240
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/blob/v2.16.0/backend/internal/token.js#L154-L182
- https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager/pull/5908
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nginx-proxy-manager-through-2.16.0-missing-brute-force-protection
httpdbg before 2.2.1 fails to validate URL schemes in recorded HTTP request URLs rendered as clickable links in the web interface. Attackers controlling traffic recorded by httpdbg can supply javascript: scheme URLs that execute malicious scripts in the application origin when clicked, allowing access to captured request and response data including headers and tokens.
- https://github.com/cle-b/httpdbg
- https://github.com/cle-b/httpdbg/blob/v2.2.0/httpdbg/hooks/recordhttp2.py#L88-L97
- https://github.com/cle-b/httpdbg/blob/v2.2.0/httpdbg/webapp/static/index.htm#L302
- https://github.com/cle-b/httpdbg/commit/121845b41c19ddaf30b51be0797bc2ff4847d8b3
- https://github.com/cle-b/httpdbg/issues/220
- https://github.com/cle-b/httpdbg/pull/222
- https://github.com/cle-b/httpdbg/releases/tag/v2.2.1
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/httpdbg-before-2.2.1-stored-cross-site-scripting-via-javascript-url
Dozzle versions before 11.1.2 fail to sanitize container display names when building ZIP archive entry names in the log download endpoint. Attackers who can label containers can use path traversal sequences to write files outside the extraction directory when users download and extract logs.
- https://github.com/amir20/dozzle
- https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/blob/v11.1.1/internal/container/docker/client.go#L610-L614
- https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/blob/v11.1.1/internal/web/download.go#L141-L146
- https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/commit/bc07db73dd84ce2cb939b744e983a8cfdf29c644
- https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/pull/5242
- https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/releases/tag/v11.1.2
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dozzle-before-11.1.2-path-traversal-via-log-zip-download
A vulnerability has been found in Ziroom ZHOME A0101 1.0.1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /api/ZRQos/set_online_client. The manipulation of the argument ip leads to command injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.