Comparison Overview
BGP International
BGP International
BGP Pakistan, 涿州, 河北省, CN
Last Update: 15/03/2026
BGP is one of the world's competitive geophysical companies, delivering a wide range of geophysical products and services. In 2002, BGP became a liability-limited company after merging with six other Chinese geophysical divisions, with its headquarters located in Zhuozh...
aramco
P.O. Box 5000, Dhahran, SA, 31311
Last Update: 20/09/2026
We’re a leading producer of the energy and chemicals that drive global commerce and enhance the daily lives of people around the globe by continuing delivering an uninterrupted supply of energy to the world. Our resilience and agility has built one of the world’s large...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
BGP International
aramco
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BGP International in 2026.
Incidents vs Oil and Gas Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for aramco in 2026.
Incident History - BGP International (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BGP International cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - aramco (X = Date, Y = Severity)
aramco cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
BGP International
aramco
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.