Comparison Overview
Bennett + Bennett

Bennett + Bennett
95 Upton Street, Bundall, 4217, AU
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Bennett + Bennett has been providing advanced surveying, urban design, town planning, spatial services and delivery of major projects for over 55 years. Established in 1968 on the Gold Coast, we have been privileged to play a significant role in key projects and areas ...

Skanska
Warfvinges väg 25 (Group Headquarters), Stockholm, SE, SE-112 74
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Skanska Group uses knowledge & foresight to shape the way people live, work, and connect. More than 138 years in the making, we’re one of the world’s largest development and construction companies, with 2024 revenue totaling SEK 177 billion. We operate in select markets...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Bennett + Bennett







Skanska






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bennett + Bennett in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Skanska in 2026.
Incident History - Bennett + Bennett (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bennett + Bennett cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Skanska (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Skanska cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Bennett + Bennett

Skanska
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.