Comparison Overview
beeline Russia

beeline Russia
Krasnoproletarskaya, 4, Moscow, 127006, RU
Last Update: 30/03/2026
VimpelCom is one of the world’s largest integrated telecommunications services operators providing voice and data services through a range of traditional and broadband mobile and fixed technologies in Russia, Italy, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, ...

MTS Group
Moscow, RU
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Mobile TeleSystems OJSC ("MTS") is the leading telecommunications group in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, offering mobile and fixed voice, broadband, pay TV as well as content and entertainment services in one of the world's fastest growing regions. Including ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

beeline Russia







MTS Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for beeline Russia in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MTS Group in 2026.
Incident History - beeline Russia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
beeline Russia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - MTS Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MTS Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

beeline Russia

MTS Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.