Comparison Overview
BeeInventor 點子建

BeeInventor 點子建
Taiwan, Floor 6, No. 30, Section 3rd, Chengde Road, Datong District, Taipei City 10363, , undefined, undefined, TW
Last Update: 01/12/2025
BeeInventor is an IoT technology company dedicated to changing the traditional construction industry. Founded in 2016, the company is now an incubatee at the Hong Kong Science Park. Leveraging our deep understanding of the construction industry, we continuously devel...

TIVIT
Avenida das Nações Unidas 8501, São Paulo, 05425-070, BR
Last Update: 12/09/2026
TIVIT is a Brazil-based multinational company that offers enterprise-level digital solutions, and operates in ten countries in Latin America. We help our clients develop their businesses by offering industry-leading digital solutions divided into four main categories: D...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

BeeInventor 點子建







TIVIT






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BeeInventor 點子建 in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TIVIT in 2026.
Incident History - BeeInventor 點子建 (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BeeInventor 點子建 cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TIVIT (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TIVIT cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

BeeInventor 點子建

TIVIT
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.