Comparison Overview
Be-Mobile

Be-Mobile
Kardinaal Mercierlaan 1A, Melle, 9090, BE
Last Update: 01/05/2026
Be-Mobile is a smart mobility service provider, headquartered in Ghent, Belgium. Leveraging its expertise, Be-Mobile develops high-tech solutions in the areas of smart mobility, traffic monitoring and management, connected vehicle technologies, traffic information, mobi...

IGT Solutions
Sector 32 Road, Plot 49, Echelon Building, Gurugram, Haryana, IN, 122 001
Last Update: 01/04/2026
IGT Solutions is a next-gen customer experience (CX) company, defining and delivering AI-led transformative experiences for the global and most innovative brands using digital technologies. With the combination of Digital and Human Intelligence, IGT becomes the preferre...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Be-Mobile







IGT Solutions






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Be-Mobile in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IGT Solutions in 2026.
Incident History - Be-Mobile (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Be-Mobile cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - IGT Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IGT Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Be-Mobile

IGT Solutions
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability has been found in SourceCodester Simple Online Food Ordering System 1.0. This affects an unknown function of the file /admin/ajax.php?action=login2. The manipulation of the argument email leads to sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A flaw was found in the ipa_getkeytab module of the community.general Ansible collection. The module's bind_pw parameter, used to supply the LDAP simple-bind password when retrieving a Kerberos keytab, is not declared with no_log, unlike the sibling password parameter in the same module. As a consequence, the supplied IPA/LDAP bind password is recorded in cleartext in the managed host's system journal/syslog (the module's "Invoked with" record), is included in the module's return values and verbose (-v) output, and is displayed in Automation Controller / AWX job output. The password is additionally passed on the command line to the ipa-getkeytab helper (as --bindpw <value>), exposing it in the process list to local users while the command runs. An attacker able to read these logs, job output, or the process table can obtain the directory bind credential, potentially compromising the accounts and objects that credential can access.
The device metadata import interface /device/instance/{productId}/property-metadata/import of jetlinks community 2.11 is vulnerable to Server-side request forgery (SSRF).
disconf (Distributed Configuration Management Platform) 2.6.36 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. The config-fetching APIs /api/config/item, /api/config/file, /api/config/list and /api/config/simple/list are exposed without authentication. The LoginInterceptor explicitly whitelists these four paths, so any anonymous attacker can read every configuration item and configuration file managed by the config center.
Funiture 1.0.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection in the backend tool interfaces /sys/tool/select.json and /sys/tool/update.json.