Comparison Overview
BBVA en Uruguay

BBVA en Uruguay
401 Calle 25 De Mayo, Montevideo, Montevideo, 11000, UY
Last Update: 10/03/2026
BBVA en Uruguay nace a principios del año 2000, de la fusión de dos importantes bancos -BBV Banco Francés Uruguay S.A. y Banco Exterior de América S.A. Argentina. En BBVA trabajamos por un futuro mejor para las personas, buscando relaciones duraderas con nuestros cli...

alrajhi bank
King Fahad Branch Road, Al Rajhi Tower, Riyadh, Riyadh Province, SA, 11411
Last Update: 04/05/2026
Founded in 1957, Al Rajhi Bank is one of the largest Islamic banks in the world with total assets of SR 384 billion (US$ 102 billion), a paid up capital of SR 25 billion (US$ 6.66 billion) and an employee base of over 9,600 associates. With over 58 years of experience i...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

BBVA en Uruguay







alrajhi bank






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BBVA en Uruguay in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
alrajhi bank has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - BBVA en Uruguay (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BBVA en Uruguay cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - alrajhi bank (X = Date, Y = Severity)
alrajhi bank cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

BBVA en Uruguay

alrajhi bank
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.