Comparison Overview
Brown & Brown Absence Services Group
Brown & Brown Absence Services Group
300 N Beach Street, Daytona Beach, 32114, US
Last Update: 22/02/2026
The Advocator Group is now Brown & Brown Absence Services Group. We offer disability insurance carriers, self-insured entities, and third-party administrators industry-wide expertise and extensive capabilities designed to help our customers overcome challenges, make mor...
Sunshine Insurance Group
朝外大街, 朝阳区, 100020, CN
Last Update: 04/09/2026
Established in July 2005, Sunshine Insurance Group has experienced sustainable development, now ranking among the Top 7 insurance groups in China, with an annual business income of $12.6 billion in 2016. Sunshine is composed of Property and Casualty Insurance, Life Insu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Brown & Brown Absence Services Group
Sunshine Insurance Group
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Brown & Brown Absence Services Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sunshine Insurance Group in 2026.
Incident History - Brown & Brown Absence Services Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Brown & Brown Absence Services Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Sunshine Insurance Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sunshine Insurance Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Brown & Brown Absence Services Group
Sunshine Insurance Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.