Comparison Overview
Bath Fitter

Bath Fitter
225 rue Roy, St-Eustache (Québec), CA, J7R 5R5
Last Update: 17/07/2026
Bath Fitter was founded in 1984 and is North America's leading acrylic bathtub, shower enclosure and tub-to-shower conversion company. Bath Fitter products are manufactured in state-of-the-art facilities in the U.S. and Canada. We are directly involved in the operation...

S-ryhmä / S Group
Fleminginkatu 34, Helsinki, Southern Finland, FI
Last Update: 02/04/2026
S-ryhmä on suomalainen vähittäiskaupan ja palvelualan yritysverkosto, jolla on Suomessa yli 1 800 toimipaikkaa. S-ryhmä muodostuu 19 itsenäisestä alueosuuskaupasta ja niiden omistamasta Suomen Osuuskauppojen Keskuskunnasta (SOK) tytäryhtiöineen. Alueellisten ja valtakun...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Bath Fitter







S-ryhmä / S Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
Bath Fitter has 11.73% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for S-ryhmä / S Group in 2026.
Incident History - Bath Fitter (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bath Fitter cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - S-ryhmä / S Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
S-ryhmä / S Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Bath Fitter

S-ryhmä / S Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.