Comparison Overview
Barghausen Consulting Engineers

Barghausen Consulting Engineers
18215 72nd Ave S, None, Kent, WA, US, 98032
Last Update: 18/11/2025
Barghausen Consulting Engineers is now a Division of Core States Group. Established in 1982, Barghausen Consulting Engineers is one of the leading multi-disciplinary service firms offering civil engineering, land surveying, land use planning, and related services. We ...

Ventia
155 Miller St, Level 27, North Sydney, New South Wales, AU, 2060
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Ventia provides essential services to make infrastructure work for communities in Australia and New Zealand. We pride ourselves on safe and sustainable services for our corporate and government clients across a broad range of sectors, including transport, telecommunic...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Barghausen Consulting Engineers







Ventia






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Barghausen Consulting Engineers in 2026.
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ventia in 2026.
Incident History - Barghausen Consulting Engineers (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Barghausen Consulting Engineers cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Ventia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ventia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Barghausen Consulting Engineers

Ventia
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.