Comparison Overview
Barcel USA

Barcel USA
301 Northpoint Drive, Suite 100, Coppell, Texas, US, 75019
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Barcel USA is the snack division of Grupo Bimbo located in the United States. We are an exciting, young and fast-growing consumer packaged goods company headquartered in Coppell, Texas with a strong presence in the largest markets within United States territory. We manu...

JDE Peet's
Oosterdoksstraat 80, Amsterdam, North Holland, NL, 1011 DK
Last Update: 05/09/2026
JDE Peet’s is the world’s leading pure-play coffee company, serving approximately 4,400 cups of coffee per second in more than 100 markets. Guided by our ‘Reignite the Amazing’ strategy, we are focusing on brand-led growth across three big bets: Peet’s, L’OR, and Jacobs...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Barcel USA







JDE Peet's






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Barcel USA in 2026.
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for JDE Peet's in 2026.
Incident History - Barcel USA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Barcel USA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - JDE Peet's (X = Date, Y = Severity)
JDE Peet's cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Barcel USA

JDE Peet's
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.