Comparison Overview
BankSA

BankSA
97 King William Street, Adelaide, South Australia, 5000, AU
Last Update: 25/12/2025
BankSA has been part of the fabric of South Australia since 1848, when The Savings Bank of South Australia began its life as a small one-person outfit. From the past to the future, we’re committed to backing the state. That’s why we back SA. It’s our commitment to the ...

TD
Toronto-Dominion Centre, P.O. Box 1, Toronto, Ontario, CA, M5K 1A2
Last Update: 20/05/2026
The Toronto-Dominion Bank & its subsidiaries are collectively known as TD Bank Group (TD). TD is the sixth largest bank in North America by assets & serves approx. 28 million customers in a number of locations in key financial centres around the globe. With over 95,000 ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

BankSA







TD






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BankSA in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TD in 2026.
Incident History - BankSA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BankSA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TD (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TD cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

BankSA

TD
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.