Comparison Overview
Banco Pichincha Perú

Banco Pichincha Perú
AV. RICARDO PALMA 278, Lima, Lima, LI18, PE
Last Update: 07/03/2026
La historia de nuestro Banco se inicia en Julio de 1964, como Financiera y Promotora de la Construcción S.A. Luego en enero de 1982, se modificó su denominación a FINANPRO Empresa Financiera. Es el 21 de Noviembre de 1986 cuando nos constituimos como el Banco comercial ...

Groupe BPCE
7, Promenade Germaine Sablon, Paris, 75013, FR
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Groupe BPCE, at the service of its customers and the French economy Groupe BPCE pursues a full range of banking and insurance activities, working through its two major Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne cooperative banking networks and through its different subsid...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Banco Pichincha Perú







Groupe BPCE






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Banco Pichincha Perú in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Groupe BPCE in 2026.
Incident History - Banco Pichincha Perú (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Banco Pichincha Perú cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Groupe BPCE (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Groupe BPCE cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Banco Pichincha Perú

Groupe BPCE
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.