Comparison Overview
Banco Azteca

Banco Azteca
Av. Insurgentes Sur 3579, México, 14020, MX
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Banco Azteca es un banco mexicano fundado en el año 2002 y es una compañía de Grupo Salinas del empresario Mexicano Ricardo Salinas Pliego. Cuenta con 1,500 sucursales en México, Panamá, Argentina, Honduras, El Salvador, Brasil y Perú; es uno de los dos bancos más grand...

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk.
Jalan Jenderal Sudirman, Kav 54-55, Jakarta, Special capital Region of Jakarta, ID, 12190
Last Update: 23/07/2026
Bank Mandiri was established on 2 October 1998, as part of the bank restructuring program of the Government of Indonesia. In July 1999, four state-owned banks - Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Dagang Negara, Bank Exim and Bapindo - were amalgamated into Bank Mandiri. The history o...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Banco Azteca







PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Banco Azteca in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk. in 2026.
Incident History - Banco Azteca (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Banco Azteca cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Banco Azteca

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.