Comparison Overview
BAM Bouw en Techniek
BAM Bouw en Techniek
Runnenburg 13, Bunnik, 3981AZ, NL
Last Update: 30/04/2026
Wij zijn een service gedreven bedrijf met geïntegreerde bouw- en beheerprojecten. Met focus op duurzaamheid, industrialisatie en digitalisering richten wij ons op de commerciële en technische ontwikkeling, voorbereiding en realisatie van Utiliteitsbouwprojecten. BAM Bou...
VINCI
1973, Boulevard de la Défense, Nanterre, 92000, FR
Last Update: 12/09/2026
VINCI is a world leader in concessions, energy and construction, employing 280.000 people in more than 120 countries. We design, finance, build and operate infrastructure and facilities that help improve daily life and mobility for all. Because we believe in all-roun...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
BAM Bouw en Techniek
VINCI
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for BAM Bouw en Techniek in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VINCI in 2026.
Incident History - BAM Bouw en Techniek (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BAM Bouw en Techniek cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - VINCI (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VINCI cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
BAM Bouw en Techniek
VINCI
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly clean up decode-side metadata for rejected inference requests in prefill/decode disaggregated deployments. Remote attackers can submit requests with max_tokens=0 to exhaust decode-worker memory without bound until the worker restarts.
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/v0.29.0/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/nixl/push_worker.py#L162-L181
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/55677
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-through-0.29.0-memory-exhaustion-via-rejected-requests
redis-parser through 3.0.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the RESP protocol parser that allows malicious Redis endpoints to crash the client process through unbounded recursion on nested arrays. Attackers can send crafted RESP byte streams with repeated array headers that exhaust the V8 call stack, causing an uncaught RangeError that terminates the Node.js process without triggering error handling callbacks.
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L204-L213
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L291-L306
- https://github.com/redis/ioredis/issues/2108
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/redis-parser-through-3.0.0-denial-of-service-via-unbounded-recursion
Improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component ('injection') in Azure Cosmos DB allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Missing authentication for critical function in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.