Comparison Overview
Balance Internet

Balance Internet
28 Freshwater Pl, Southbank, Victoria, 3006, AU
Last Update: 27/04/2026
Founded in 2008, Balance specialises in designing, developing, and supporting high-performing, fully integrated, digital commerce solutions. We partner with leading brands (B2C, B2B & D2C), educational institutions, corporations and government departments to drive growt...

SLB
5599 San Felipe St, Houston, Texas, US, 77056
Last Update: 21/05/2026
We are a technology company that unlocks access to energy for the benefit of all. As innovators, that’s been our mission for nearly a century. Today, we face a global imperative to create a future with more energy, but less carbon. Our diverse, innovative change makers ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Balance Internet







SLB






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Balance Internet in 2026.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SLB in 2026.
Incident History - Balance Internet (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Balance Internet cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SLB (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SLB cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Balance Internet

SLB
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Capgo (Cap-go/capgo) before 12.128.2 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the SECURITY DEFINER PostgREST RPC function public.record_build_time, which is granted to the anon role and callable with only the public Supabase publishable (sb_publishable_*) anon key. An unauthenticated attacker can insert rows into public.build_logs for arbitrary organizations and, because the function uses ON CONFLICT (build_id, org_id) DO UPDATE, can overwrite existing usage/billing records by reusing the same build_id for a target org. This enables cross-tenant tampering of billing build logs and financial-impact denial of service by inflating billable build time.
Cap-go before 12.128.2 contains an authentication logic flaw that lets an attacker register and control an account bound to a victim's email address before that email is verified. By enabling two-factor authentication on the pre-registered account, the attacker gains control over the account claimed under the victim's identity, allowing them to read and modify its state and enforce organization-level policies, while the legitimate user is denied access to the account tied to their own email.
Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a flaw in the Enforce Password Policy feature: after a Super Admin enables the policy and successfully changes their password to a compliant one, the backend does not update the password-compliance state. As a result, the backend continues to treat the account as non-compliant and repeatedly forces password-reset prompts, permanently locking the Super Admin out of organization access (organization lockout / denial of service) despite valid authentication.
Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a cross-tenant authorization bypass vulnerability in PostgREST endpoints that allows org-scoped read API keys to access other tenants' webhook secrets and delivery logs. Attackers can query the webhooks and webhook_deliveries endpoints to exfiltrate HMAC signing secrets and delivery payloads, enabling forged webhook events against victim organizations.
Cap-go before 12.128.2 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in OTP verification that allows attackers to bypass email verification by modifying server responses. Attackers can intercept OTP verification requests and manipulate HTTP responses to falsely mark verification successful, enabling unauthorized 2FA enablement and account takeover.