Comparison Overview
Babcock International Group

Babcock International Group
33 Wigmore Street, London, W1U 1QX, GB
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Babcock is a FTSE 100 defence company operating in our focus countries of the UK, Australasia, Canada, France and South Africa, with exports to additional markets. Our Purpose, to create a safe and secure world, together, defines our strategy. We support and enhance o...

Saab
Olof Palmes gata 17, Stockholm, SE
Last Update: 14/09/2026
As a leading defence and security company, we offer solutions that range from the depths of the oceans to high in the sky, on land and in cyberspace, to keep people and society safe. Empowered by our 22,000 talented people, we constantly push the boundaries of technolo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Babcock International Group







Saab






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Babcock International Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Saab in 2026.
Incident History - Babcock International Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Babcock International Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Saab (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Saab cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Babcock International Group

Saab
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security flaw has been discovered in THU-MIG yoloe up to 40cd606cabdbe2b566d6f14a6b162c89206e9a1b. This affects the function eval of the file ultralytics/nn/autobackend.py of the component AutoBackend Model Loading. The manipulation of the argument imgsz/names/kpt_shape results in improper neutralization of directives in dynamically evaluated code. The attack requires a local approach. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Coder before 2.34.7 contains an IP spoofing vulnerability in the ExtractRealIPAddress middleware that trusts the leftmost, client-supplied X-Forwarded-For value instead of the client IP appended by a reverse proxy. Attackers can send forged X-Forwarded-For values through appending proxies to bypass per-IP rate limits on login, one-time passcode, and password validation endpoints, enabling brute-force attacks, and to falsify IP addresses recorded in audit logs.
Coder before 2.29.17, 2.30.0 before 2.32.7, 2.33.0 before 2.33.8, and 2.34.0 before 2.34.2 contains a user enumeration vulnerability because userpassword.Compare() substitutes a placeholder hash derived from the string "hunter2" when a stored password hash is empty. Unauthenticated attackers can submit logins with the password "hunter2" and distinguish HTTP 403 from 401 responses to enumerate valid accounts and reveal the authentication provider of SSO-only users.
Coder before 2.29.17, 2.30.0 before 2.32.7, 2.33.0 before 2.33.8, and 2.34.0 before 2.34.2 contains a stored HTML injection vulnerability because the ApplicationName and LogoURL appearance settings are rendered into HTML output without sufficient escaping. Attackers with the Owner role can store HTML markup in these settings that renders in the Coder dashboard and in SMTP notification emails sent to other deployment users.
Coder from 2.0.0 before 2.34.8 contains an open redirect vulnerability in handleAPIKeySmuggling that allows attackers to redirect users externally via unsanitized r.URL.Path values. Attackers can craft links on trusted workspace app subdomains with paths beginning with double slashes, which become scheme-relative redirects to attacker sites for phishing.