Comparison Overview
AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe

AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe
Hvězdova 1689, Praha, 140 62, CZ
Last Update: 19/02/2026
AXA Partners is an AXA transversal business unit offering a wide range of solutions in assistance services, travel and specialized insurance and credit protection. AXA Partners’ role is also to implement innovative solutions emerging from the AXA Innovation unit. Our ...

Suncorp Group
80 Ann St, Brisbane, 4000, AU
Last Update: 07/09/2026
Suncorp offers insurance products and services through some of Australia and New Zealand’s most recognised brands. Our purpose is to build futures and protect what matters – the focus of our company for more than 100 years. With the passion of our people, and our por...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe







Suncorp Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Suncorp Group in 2026.
Incident History - AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Suncorp Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Suncorp Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe

Suncorp Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.