Comparison Overview
AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe

AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe
Hvězdova 1689, Praha, 140 62, CZ
Last Update: 19/02/2026
AXA Partners is an AXA transversal business unit offering a wide range of solutions in assistance services, travel and specialized insurance and credit protection. AXA Partners’ role is also to implement innovative solutions emerging from the AXA Innovation unit. Our ...

Mapfre
Carretera de Pozuelo, 52, Majadahonda, Community of Madrid, ES, 28220
Last Update: 03/09/2026
At Mapfre, we’ve spent more than 90 years supporting people and businesses around the world, taking care of what matters most to them. We offer insurance, financial, and service solutions that evolve with you. Our experience and commitment, combined with a constant focu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe







Mapfre






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mapfre in 2026.
Incident History - AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Mapfre (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mapfre cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

AXA Partners Central & Eastern Europe

Mapfre
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.