Comparison Overview
AVL

AVL
Hans-List Platz 1, Graz, undefined, 8020, AT
Last Update: 20/03/2026
AVL List GmbH (“AVL”) with its headquarters in Graz, is one of the world’s leading mobility technology companies for development, simulation and testing in the automotive industry, and in other sectors such as rail, marine, and energy. Based on extensive in-house resear...

MAHLE
Pragstrasse 26-46, Stuttgart, D-70376, DE
Last Update: 30/03/2026
MAHLE is a leading international development partner and supplier to the automotive industry with customers in both passenger car and commercial vehicle sectors. Founded in 1920, the technology group is working on the climate-neutral mobility of tomorrow, with a focus o...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

AVL







MAHLE






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AVL in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MAHLE in 2026.
Incident History - AVL (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AVL cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - MAHLE (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MAHLE cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

AVL

MAHLE
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.