Comparison Overview
Avison Young | Germany

Avison Young | Germany
Bockenheimer Anlage 44, Frankfurt, Hesse, 60322, DE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Avison Young creates real economic, social and environmental value as a global real estate advisor, powered by people. Our local expertise across Germany, paired with a global network of collective intelligence and some of the smartest technology in the industry, work...

Keller Williams Realty, LLC
Suite 400, Austin, TX, US, 78746
Last Update: 18/09/2026
Austin, Texas-based Keller Williams, the world’s largest real estate franchise by agent count, has more than 1,100 offices and 176,000 agents. The franchise is also No. 1 in units and sales volume in the United States. Since 1983, the company has cultivated an agent-c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Avison Young | Germany







Keller Williams Realty, LLC






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Avison Young | Germany in 2026.
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Keller Williams Realty, LLC in 2026.
Incident History - Avison Young | Germany (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Avison Young | Germany cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Keller Williams Realty, LLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Keller Williams Realty, LLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Avison Young | Germany

Keller Williams Realty, LLC
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.