Comparison Overview
Audi Stuttgart GmbH

Audi Stuttgart GmbH
Heilbronner Straße 340, Stuttgart, 70469, DE
Last Update: 25/02/2026
Herzlichen willkommen bei Audi Stuttgart GmbH – Ihrem Partner für Vorsprung durch Technik in der Region! Mit unseren Standorten in Feuerbach, Vaihingen und Böblingen bieten wir mit unseren knapp 400 Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern ein umfassendes Angebot rund um die M...

Gestamp
Calle de Alfonso XII, 16, Madrid, Community of Madrid, ES, 28014
Last Update: 21/09/2026
Gestamp is a multinational specialized in the design, development and manufacture of highly engineered metal components for the main vehicle manufacturers. It develops products with an innovative design to produce lighter and safer vehicles, which offer lower energy con...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Audi Stuttgart GmbH







Gestamp






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Audi Stuttgart GmbH in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Gestamp in 2026.
Incident History - Audi Stuttgart GmbH (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Audi Stuttgart GmbH cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Gestamp (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Gestamp cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Audi Stuttgart GmbH

Gestamp
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.