Comparison Overview
Audi Leipzig GmbH

Audi Leipzig GmbH
Richard-Lehmann-Straße 124, Leipzig, Sachsen 04277, DE
Last Update: 30/10/2025
Audi Leipzig GmbH is an automotive company based out of Süd - R.-Lehmann-Str. 124, 04277 Leipzig; Nord - Maximilianalle 25, Leipzig, Saxony, Germany.

AUDI AG
Auto-Union-Straße 1, Ingolstadt, 85045, DE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
#WeAreProgress ++ Progress is in our DNA. It’s not just in our cars, but also in us. The focus at Audi is on us – the people – and we are shaping the future of mobility together. With our inner drive. With the aim to continuously improve. With our mindset, courage and c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Audi Leipzig GmbH







AUDI AG






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Audi Leipzig GmbH in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AUDI AG in 2026.
Incident History - Audi Leipzig GmbH (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Audi Leipzig GmbH cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - AUDI AG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AUDI AG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Audi Leipzig GmbH

AUDI AG
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Capgo (Cap-go/capgo) before 12.128.2 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the SECURITY DEFINER PostgREST RPC function public.record_build_time, which is granted to the anon role and callable with only the public Supabase publishable (sb_publishable_*) anon key. An unauthenticated attacker can insert rows into public.build_logs for arbitrary organizations and, because the function uses ON CONFLICT (build_id, org_id) DO UPDATE, can overwrite existing usage/billing records by reusing the same build_id for a target org. This enables cross-tenant tampering of billing build logs and financial-impact denial of service by inflating billable build time.
Cap-go before 12.128.2 contains an authentication logic flaw that lets an attacker register and control an account bound to a victim's email address before that email is verified. By enabling two-factor authentication on the pre-registered account, the attacker gains control over the account claimed under the victim's identity, allowing them to read and modify its state and enforce organization-level policies, while the legitimate user is denied access to the account tied to their own email.
Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a flaw in the Enforce Password Policy feature: after a Super Admin enables the policy and successfully changes their password to a compliant one, the backend does not update the password-compliance state. As a result, the backend continues to treat the account as non-compliant and repeatedly forces password-reset prompts, permanently locking the Super Admin out of organization access (organization lockout / denial of service) despite valid authentication.
Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a cross-tenant authorization bypass vulnerability in PostgREST endpoints that allows org-scoped read API keys to access other tenants' webhook secrets and delivery logs. Attackers can query the webhooks and webhook_deliveries endpoints to exfiltrate HMAC signing secrets and delivery payloads, enabling forged webhook events against victim organizations.
Cap-go before 12.128.2 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in OTP verification that allows attackers to bypass email verification by modifying server responses. Attackers can intercept OTP verification requests and manipulate HTTP responses to falsely mark verification successful, enabling unauthorized 2FA enablement and account takeover.