Comparison Overview
Ask Applications

Ask Applications
undefined, New York, NY, undefined, US
Last Update: 12/11/2025
A division of IAC (Nasdaq: IAC), Ask Applications is one of the world’s largest distributors of desktop applications, browser extensions, and PC optimization software. Our mission is simple: build cool software that makes life easier in just a few clicks. Our extensive ...

NetEase
No.599 Wangshang Road, Binjiang District, Hangzhou, 310052, CN
Last Update: 22/09/2026
As a leading internet technology company based in China, NetEase, Inc. (NASDAQ: NTES and HKEX:9999, "NetEase") provides premium online services centered around content creation. With extensive offerings across its expanding gaming ecosystem, NetEase develops and operat...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Ask Applications







NetEase






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ask Applications in 2026.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NetEase in 2026.
Incident History - Ask Applications (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ask Applications cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - NetEase (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NetEase cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Ask Applications

NetEase
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.