Comparison Overview
ASE Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd

ASE Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd
Hilir Sungai Kluang 4, Bayan Lepas Free Industrial Zone Phase 4, 11900 Bayan Lepas, Pulau Pinang, Bayan Lepas, 11900, MY
Last Update: 03/05/2026
A Success Enabler ASE Electronics (M) Sdn. Bhd. was established in 1991 and located in Penang, Malaysia. We are a semiconductor manufacturing service provider of assembly packaging and testing solutions to global semiconductor companies. Global Leadership ASEM is a mem...

Micron Technology
8000 S Federal Way, Boise, Idaho, US, 83706
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Micron is an industry leader in innovative memory and storage solutions transforming how the world uses information to enrich life for all. With a relentless focus on our customers, technology leadership, and manufacturing and operational excellence, Micron delivers a r...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ASE Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd







Micron Technology






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ASE Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd in 2026.
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Micron Technology in 2026.
Incident History - ASE Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ASE Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Micron Technology (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Micron Technology cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ASE Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd

Micron Technology
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.