Comparison Overview
Arthrex Swiss AG

Arthrex Swiss AG
Hühnerhubelstrasse 60, Belp, Bern 3123, CH
Last Update: 15/07/2026
Arthrex gehört zu den weltweit führenden Unternehmen im Bereich Orthopädie, Arthroskopie, Sportmedizin und Orthobiologie. Getreu unserer Mission „Helping Surgeons Treat Their Patients Better ™“ entwickeln wir seit über 35 Jahren innovative Produkte und Operationsverfahr...

Danaher Corporation
2200 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, 20037, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Danaher is a leading global life sciences and diagnostics innovator, committed to accelerating the power of science and technology to improve human health. We partner with customers across the globe to help them solve their most complex challenges, architecting solution...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Arthrex Swiss AG







Danaher Corporation






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Arthrex Swiss AG in 2026.
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Danaher Corporation in 2026.
Incident History - Arthrex Swiss AG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Arthrex Swiss AG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Danaher Corporation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Danaher Corporation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Arthrex Swiss AG

Danaher Corporation
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.