Comparison Overview
Arrow ECS Education Services

Arrow ECS Education Services
undefined, EMEA, UK, undefined, GB
Last Update: 29/01/2026
Arrow ECS Education provides leading IT technical training and certification across major IT vendors around Security, Storage and Virtualisation/Cloud services. Services are delivered in the classroom, virtually or as elearning across the UK and EMEA. We understand you...

Allianz Technology
Dieselstraße 8, Unterföhring, Bavaria, DE, 85774
Last Update: 13/09/2026
With its headquarters in Munich, Germany, Allianz Technology is Allianz's global IT service provider and delivers IT solutions that drive the group's digitalization. With more than 11,000 employees in more than 20 countries around the world, Allianz Technology is tasked...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Arrow ECS Education Services







Allianz Technology






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Arrow ECS Education Services in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Allianz Technology in 2026.
Incident History - Arrow ECS Education Services (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Arrow ECS Education Services cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Allianz Technology (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Allianz Technology cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Arrow ECS Education Services

Allianz Technology
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.